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FEDERAL JUDICIAL SELECTION IN A TIME OF
DIVIDED GOVERNMENT
Carl Tobias•
Congress has authorized 179 active judges for the United States Courts of
Appeals and 649 active judges for the United States District Courts. Eighty-two
judgeships are now vacant,1 although the size and complexity of federal
caseloads continue to increase. More than thirty openings are considered
"judicial emergencies"2 because they have remained unfilled for eighteen
months. The Ninth Circuit, which nrust resolve the largest docket of the twelve
regional appellate courts, currently has nine vacancies on a circuit with twentyeight active judges and for which the Judicial Conference has recommended the
creation of nine additional judgeships. The Speedy Trial Act's requirement that
criminal cases receive preferential treatment has precluded numerous district
judges from conducting a single civil trial since 1995, while the district courts
have a civil backlog of thousands of suits.3
Only seventeen judges secured appointment during 1996; however, this
situation can be explained because it was a presidential election year. President
Bill Clinton had placed a mere nine judges on the courts by early September
1997, although the concerted efforts of the Chief Executive and of Senator Orrin
Hatch (R-Utah), chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee, enabled thirty-six
judges ultimately to be named in 1997.4 Nevertheless, this figure strikingly
contrasts with the eighty-five judges whom President Ronald Reagan appointed
during the first year of his second Administration. Indeed, Chief Justice
William H. Rehnquist recently characterized as "bleak'' the prospects for
appointing judges to the eighty open seats, and admonished the "President [to]
nominate candidates with reasonable promptness, and the Senate [to] act within
a reasonable time to confirm or reject them"5
• Professor of law, University of Montana. I wish to thank Peggy Sanner and Hank Waters for valuable
suggestions, Cecelia Palmer and Charlotte Wtlmcrton for processing this piece, and Ann and Tom Boone and
the Hanis Trust for generous, continuing support. Errors that remain are mine.
1 See Judicial Baxscore, nm THIRD BRANCH, Feb. 1998, at 8.
2 Id.
3 See infra note 70 and accompanying text.
4 Cad Tobias,I771ought/771awa Vacancy, NAT'LLJ., Jan. 12, 1998, atA19.
s WtlliamH. Rehnquist, 771e 1997 Year-End Report of the Federal Judiciary, nm THIRD BRANCH Jan.
1998, at3.
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The judicial vacancies difficulty will intensify over the course of President
Clinton's second term as many Republican senators become more reluctant to
expedite confinnation and as the number of empty judgeships and civil and
criminal :filings inexorably grows. Because the remote possibility of promptly
confirming judges for all of the openings and the ever-increasing magnitude and
complexity of dockets will erode the federal justice system and the conundrum
might well be endemic to modem democracy, the dilemma warrants analysis.
This Article undertakes that effort
The first Section of this Article descriptively examines the history of federal
judicial selection, emphasizing recent developments which led to the problem
involving appointments. I find that a constellation of phenomena which can be
ascribed to numerous institutions and people with some responsibility for
choosing judges has created, left unresolved, or exacerbated the complications
caused by unfilled judicial seats. Moreover, the problem actually has two facets. One is the persistent vacancies problem Its principal sources are expanded
federal court jurisdiction and exponential caseload growth that have required
Congress to enlarge the bench significantly, thereby concomitantly increasing
the number and frequency of openings, since the 1960s. The other component is
the current impasse. The present dilemma's primary origins are political, and it
derives at least in part from different political parties' control of the White
House and the Senate.
This evaluation also reveals that the complication presented by vacancies is
at once complex and sensitive. It comprises a plethora of matters which range
from questions that involve separation of powers to issues implicating raw partisan politics. For example, those who participate in the selection process nmst
carefully strike an appropriate balance between the need for expeditious appointment and for meticulous scrutiny of individuals who will exercise the
enormous power of the state and have life tenure. I conclude that the large nwnber of judicial vacancies and their protracted nature threaten the federal courts
and that the problem must be treated promptly.
The next part of the Article, therefore, explores possible solutions for empty
judgeships which many officials in the executive, legislative and judicial
branches of government might employ. I assess the approaches mainly in terms
of their advisability, as matters of pragmatic policy, practical politics and sound
governance, ascertaining that they would have varying degrees of efficacy. For
instance, some measures could address the unnecessary delay which attends the
permanent difficulty, but nruch delay is inherent and resists felicitous reduction.
Public officials, principally in the Administration and the Senate, might
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concomitantly apply numerous mechanisms that would solve those political
problems which contribute substantially to the existing dilemma if they had
sufficient political will. Because important features of the generic complication
and the recent impasse may only be amenable to amelioration, I also discuss
means of addressing the effects of vacancies. The final Section affords
suggestions for implementing specific alternatives that apparently would have
the greatest promise.
I. ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE PROBLEM OF JUDICIAL VACANCIES

The origins and development of the problem of unfilled judicial openings
warrant comparatively thorough examination in this Section even though several
studies have rather comprehensively chronicled that background6 because detailed treatment improves understanding of the two-part difficulty. The focus of
analysis for the generic problem is the last three decades when broadened jurisdiction and mounting dockets led Congress to expand the federal judiciary,
which prompted corresponding increases in both the number of vacancies and
their frequency. Evaluation of the current impasse concentrates on 1996 and
1997 when judicial selection apparently became more politicized.

A. The Persistent Vacancies.Problem
The history of the permanent openings conundrum might seem to require
relatively limited assessment for several reasons. First, this background has received comparatively extensive examination elsewhere.7 Second, much delay in
the traditional appointments process is intrinsic and thus cannot be alleviated
easily. Third, the longstanding complication is apparently less responsible than
political phenomena for the existing dilemma. However, the rather thorough
treatment which follows should enhance appreciation, particularly of developments that prefigured the present impasse.
6 See, e.g., Gonion Bcm!ant ct al., Judicial Vacancies: An Examination of the Problem and Possible
Solutions, 14 MISS. C. I... REV. 319 (1994); Improving the Process of Appointing Federal Judges: A Report of
the Miller Center Commission on the Selection of Federal Judges (1996) ("Miller Report"). See generally
HAROLD W. CHAsE, FEDERAL JUDGES, THE APPOINTING PROCESS (1972); SHELDON GoLDMAN, PICKING
FEDERAL JUDGES: LOWER COURT SELECl10N FROM ROOSEVELT THROUGH REAGAN (1997); DAVID M.
O'BRIEN, JUDICIALROULEITE (1988).
7 See, e.g., Bcllll3D1 ct al., supra note 6; The Committee on Federal Courts, Remedying the Permanent
Vacancy Problem in the Federal Judiciary-The Problem ofJudicial Vacancies and Its Causes, 42 REC. Ass'N
B. CrIY N.Y. 374 (1987) ("N.Y. City Bax"); Victor Williams, Solutions to Federal Judicial Gridlock, 16
JUDICATURE 185 (1993).
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The persistent vacancies difficulty is comprised of many strands, numerous
of which have their origins in the republic's earliest days and in Article II of the
Constitution. Nevertheless, I emphasize the problem's modem dimensions: the
expansion of the jurisdiction of federal courts and their multiplying caseloads,
which required Congress to authorize many additional judges, thereby increasing the number and frequency of openings.
I. The Early History

The Appointments Clause provides that the President "shall nominate, and
by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint" judges.8 In
The Federalist, Alexander Hamilton explained that the senatorial role envisioned "would be an excellent check upon a spirit of fuvoritism in the President,
and would tend greatly to prevent the appointment of unfit characters" while
serving as an "efficacious source of stability in the Administration."9 The
Framers thus explicitly provided and consciously contemplated that politics
would be central to judicial selection.
The Senate has actively participated in naming judges since the chamber's
creation because members of this body have a significant stake in affecting, or
appearing to affect, appointments. 1 Complicated political accommodations implicating the Senate and the Chief Executive in the early phases of the selection
process have been essential to its efficient operation.11 There has also been a
venerable tradition of senatorial involvement in the choice of nominees, particularly for federal district court seats. The states' senators or senior elected
officials who are members of the President's political party have ordinarily recommended candidates whom the Chief Executive in tum has nominated. 12

°

8 U.S. CONST. mt. IJ, § 2, cl. 2. See generally CHASE, supra note 6 The Constitution assigns the President and the Senate nmch more respoDS1llility for judicial selection than the House of Rcprcsematives and the
judicimy. When refcning to the Presidcm, I include Executive Branch officials, such as attorneys in the Office
of White House Counsel and the Dcpartmclll of Justice, who assist the Presidcllt. When refcning to the Senate,
I include the Judicimy Committee, which has prinwy respoDS1llility for the confumation process, and its chair,
Senator Onin Hatch (R-Utah), the Senate Majority Leader, Senator Trem Lott (R-Miss.), and individual senators.

9 THEFEDERAI.lSTNo. 76, at513 (Alexander Hamilton) (1.E. Cookccd., 1961).
10 See CHASE, supra note 6, at 7.
11
See Bcllllllllt ct al., supra note 6, at 321.
12
When Lawrence Walsh seIVCd as Presidcm Dwight Eisenhower's Deputy Attorney General, he found It
virtually impossillle to secure confumation if one senator ftom the candidate's state was "openly or secretly
opposed to the nomination." Lawrence E. Walsh, The Federal Judiciary-Progress and the Road Ahead, 43 1.
AM. 1UDICA'IURI! SOC'Y 155, 156 (1960); see also Miller Report, supra note 6, at 4 (providing Attorney General Robert Kcnncdy'a characterization as senatorial appointment with President's advice and consem).
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Politics, therefore, pervade the judicial appointments process. When the
President and powerful members of the Senate disagree, they often behave strategically to secure benefit and to control consequent nomination and confirmation. 13 Indeed, both sides in these disputes have intentionally invoked delay for
tactical purposes. 14 Tension between the Chief Executive and senators may be
inevitable so long as senatorial consent is a requirement for appointment15
In short, judicial selection has been a shared responsibility of the President
and the Senate and has been politicized since the country's founding. However,

significant numbers of vacancies, which remained unfilled for protracted periods, only became a serious problem after the mid-twentieth centmy. Indeed,
from the time when Congress passed the Judiciary Act of 1789 until 1950, the
number of lower court judgeships only gradually grew to 277, which meant that
the comparatively few openings and their relative infrequency facilitated the
prompt filling of vacancies and avoided the difficulty which has ultimately
arisen. 16
2. History Since 1950

Congress has vastly enlarged federal court jurisdiction since 1950.17 The
legislative branch created many new civil causes of actions and numerous additional crimes which fostered a 300% annual increase in district court filings
during the subsequent four decades. 18 Congress correspondingly expanded the
number of federal judges to treat the rising dockets; there are 828 active appellate and districtjudgeships today.19
The Committee on Long Range Planning of the Judicial Conference of the
United States, in a comprehensive 1995 study of the federal court system.and its
future, projected that continuing caseload increases would require 1,330 active

13
14

See BelDlllllt et al., supra note 6, at 321.
See, e.g., CHAsE, supra note 6, at 14, 40; BclDlllllt ct al., supra note 6, at 321.
15 Two routes appan:ntly lead "out of that requirement. One ICqllires constitutional inteipretatiOD, the
other constitutional amendment." Bcmiant et al., supra note 6, at 322.
16 See Miller Report, supra note 6, at 3.
17
See Miller Report, supra note 6.
18
See, e.g., Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 {codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994)); Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103322, 108 Stat. 1796 (codified at42 U.S.C.§§ 13701-14223 (1995)); see also Miller Report, supra note 6, at 3.
See generally Carl Tobias, The New Certiorari and a National Study ofthe Appeals Courts, 81 CORNELL L.
R.i!V. 1264, 1268-70 (1996) ("Tobias, New Certioran"').
19 See Miller Report, supra note 6, at 3.
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judgeships by the year 2000; 2,300 by 2010 and 4,070 by 2020.2 Considerable
additional growth of the federal bench seems probable, particularly given Congress's apparent reluctance to constrict federal civil or criminal jurisdiction,21
even though the desirability of expansion is very controversial.22
The Judicial Conference also found that the time between a seat opening and
confirmation has been lengthening.23 During the decade and a half spanning
1980 to 1995, nominations on average consumed a year and confirmations required three months, and the time needed for each component of the process
seemed to be increasing.24 Furthermore, a 1994 Federal Judicial Center study of
the period between 1970 and 1992 showed that ''vacancy rates almost doubled
in the courts of appeal and more than doubled in the district courts," while the
greatest delay in appointments occurred between the date when a vacancy arose
and the date someone was nominated to :fill it25
Politics nave always been important to judicial appointments.26 However,
some observers of the selection process believe that it has become increasingly
politicized since the 1960s. They trace the origins of this phenomenon to the
Administration of President Richard Nixon, who pledged to bring back "law and
order" by naming judicial conservatives and "strict constructionists."27

a. The Basic Framework ofModern Judicial Selection
At the district court level, the states' senators or the highest ranking officials
of the President's political party typically begin the process of judicial selection
by recommending candidates for the Chief Executive's consideration.28
20 See Judicial Confi:rcnce of the UDited States, LONG RANGE PLAN FOR nm FEDERAL COURTS 16 (1995)
("LONG RANGE PLAN").
21 See Miller Report, supra note 6, at 3. See generally William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds,
Elitism, Expediency. and the New Certiorari: Requiem for the Learned Hand Tradition, 81 CORNl!LLL. Rl!V.
273 (1996).
22 Compare Stephen Reinhardt, A Plea to Save the Federal Courts: Too Few Judges, Too Many Cases,
A.B.A. J., Jan. 1993, at 52, with Gerald Bard Tjoflat, More Judges, Less Justice, The Case Against Expansion
ofthe Federal Judldary, A.B.A. J., July 1993, at 70.
23 See LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 20, at 103.
24 Miller Report, supra note 6, at 3-4.
25 See Bermant ct al., supra note 6, at 323.
26 See supra notes 8-16 and accompanying tat.
27 See O'BRIEN, supra note 6, at 20; Roger E. Hartley & Lisa M. Holmes, Increasing Senate Scrutiny of
Lawer Federal Court Nominees, 80 JUDICATURE 274, 274 (1997).
28
I rely 5Ubstantially in this subsection on the Miller Report, supra note 6, at 3-6 and N.Y. City Bar, supra note 7, at 375. Each presidential administration varies these basic proced\D'cs somewhat. See CHASE, supra
note 6; GoLDMAN, supra note 6; O'BRIEN, supra note 6.
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Designees nmst complete three lengthy questionnaires for the Department of
Justice, the Senate Judiciary Committee, and the American Bar Association
(ABA) Standing Committee on Judiciary. Officials in the Justice Department
and the White House first screen and then evaluate and interview the potential
nominees, while the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) conducts a
background investigation and security check of the individuals.
If these reviews are satisfactory, the President formally nominates the candidates and submits their names to the Senate. The ABA Committee and some
private entities which monitor judicial selection, such as the Free Congress
Foundation and the Alliance for Justice, usually assess nominees at this juncture.
The Senate, primarily through the Judiciary Committee, investigates and analyzes the nominees, accords the people hearings, and votes on them. The names
of persons whom the Committee approves are transmitted to the full Senate, and
the Senate Majority Leader schedules floor votes on nominees, who nmst secure
a majority for confirmation. Analogous procedures apply to appellate court
designees, although the White House and the Justice Department typically exercise more responsibility for the initial selection.

b. Nomination Process
The period between vacancy and nomination, the phase of the process which
the Executive Branch principally controls, consumes the greatest amount of time
in judicial appointments. One important reason for this is that many active
judges have not traditionally given advance notice of their intention to modify
active status. In 1988, the Judicial Conference "[u]rged all judges nearing
retirement to notify the President and the Administrative Office as fur in
advance as possible of a change in status-if possible, six to twelve months
before the contemplated date of change in status."29 Numerous judges who
envisioned altering their c~tances have since complied with this request
However, a number of judges have failed to provide notice, apparently because
they were unaware of the Conference policy or for other reasons, such as the
highly personal chi!racter of retirement decisions.30
An additional, significant explanation for delay at the nomination stage is
that varying procedures, which reflect openings' level in the court structure and
geographic locality, the decisionmaking styles of those participating in selection,
29 REPORTS OF nm PROCEEDINGS OF nm JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF nm UNITi!D SfATl!S 31-32 (Mar. IS,

1988).

30 LoNG RANG!! PLAN, supra note 20, at 104; BeIIllllllt et al, supra note 6, at 334 n.43.
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and prevailing political realities, currently lead to the selection of numerous
candidates.31 Therefore, unsystematic and even idiosyncratic processes to which
insufficient resources may be connnitted have yielded nominees. For instance,
some senators might not employ connnissions or use panels that operate
privately. Certain members of the Senate await staff :findings, and others may
be reluctant to select among nmltiple, qualified aspirants.32 Numerous senators
have correspondingly insisted on recom-mending one individual to the Chief
Executive, but several recent Presidents have requested at least three names. 33
Although the Clinton Administration has sought only one person, thereby
reducing the number of people to be screened, even that approach can cause
delay if the single candidate proves problematic.34 These temporal restraints
might be exacerbated in states which experience infrequent vacancies and thus
may have to create ad hoc or reinvent selection procedures or in states whose
senior elected officials have difficulty reaching consensus.
Rather recent increases in the number of officials who assist with
appointments seem to be another source of delay. For example, the Miller
Connnission-a bi-partisan entity comprised of distinguished attorneys who
studied the selection process and issued a 1996 report-was somewhat SUiprised
to learn that the number of participants has significantly expanded, a situation
which it ascribed to the practice of conducting "more extensive interviews on a
range of issues [that] appears to have begun in 1981."35 Numerous Connnission
members seriously questioned the interviews' efficacy because "experience has
proved that it is difficult to be sure just how persons selected for the federal
bench will in fact perform," while the connnissioners stated that nominees'
"experience, record for integrity, intellectual capacity," and professional
colleagues' judgments regarding objectivity and temperament were the best
indicators of future performance and that "those judgments are relatively easy to
ascertain."36 The Connnission correspond-ingly found that White House
officials, Justice Department lawyers, the FBI, and the ABA, all of whom

31 Ben:nant et al., supra note 6, at 335. See generally ABA, Standing Committee on Federal JudiciaiyWhat It Is and How It Works (1983) {"ABA").
32

See Miller Report, supra note 6, at 5.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Id. at 2. The bi-partisan commission included presem and fonn.cr federal district and circuit judges,
fo1JI1Cr White House counsels to Republicans and Democrats, fonn.cr Justice Departmcm officials, fonn.cr se1111tors, a prominem lawyer, and a law professor. Id.
36
Id. at 8-9
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investigate and evaluate candidates, serve duplicative functions, some of which
may be unavoidable.37

c. The ABA Standing Committee on Federal Judiciary
During the 1950s, President Eisenhower sought the ABA's assistance in
analyzing nominees because his Attorney General, Herbert Brownell, was
concerned that purely political appointees might lack the requisite competence to
serve on the federal bench.38 Since mid-century, the Standing Committee on
Federal Judiciary has assessed candidates' professional qualifications and, thus,
might be partly responsible for delay in judicial selection. The entity, which has
included one representative from each appeals court, may have lacked sufficient
resources for evaluating and rating nominees promptly enough to permit
expeditious completion of the process's remaining phase.39 Moreover,
questionnaires and other features of Committee investigations have apparently
been redundant and consumed too nmch time.40 Furthermore, Democrats and
Republicans as well as liberals and conservatives have criticized the ABA's
participation in judicial appointments, primarily for being overly political.41
Notwithstanding the above problems, particularly the politically controversial
nature of the ABA's participation, numerous observers believe that the
Committee has performed a valuable service in analyzing nominees and may
even have enhanced the caliber of those judges named.42

d. Confirmation Process
The vetting of nominees and the scheduling of confirmation hearings by the
Senate Judiciary Committee have also delayed judicial selection, although the
nomination process has consumed greater time.43 The Committee has apparently
lacked sufficient staff counsel to perform investigations of nominees, especially
when reviewing significant numbers of individuals. The Committee has occa37 Id. at5.
38 See Miller Report, supra note 6, at 11. See generally ABA, supra note 31.
39 See Miller Report, supra note 6, at 8.
40 See Id. at 5~.
41 See, e.g., MARK GITENSTEIN, MATI'ERS OF"l'RINCIPLE 203-05 (1992); Sheldon Goldman, The Bush
Imprint on the Judiciary: Canylng on a Tradition, 14 JUDICATURE 294, 295 (1991).
42 See, e.g., Miller Report, supra note 6, at 11; Harold R. Tyler, Jr., Judge Selection: Keeping Politics
Out; In Defense of the ABA 's Role in Rating Nominees, LEGAL TIMEs, Nov. 9, 1992, at 27; see also infra
notes 82-83 and accompanying text (affording recent histoiy).
43 Miller Report, supra note 6, at 5; N.Y. City Bar, supra note 7, at 375-76; see also supra text accompanying note 24.
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sionally borrowed Justice Department attorneys to assist it in completing these
inquiries. Moreover, the need to hold hearings when busy Committee members
can attend has complicated the proceedings' prompt scheduling and has delayed
confirmation. The Committee conducts hearings for all nominees, including
people who are not controversial; and its sessions, which are essentially ceremonial, consume scarce resources that could be devoted to considering additional persons. Another source of delay has been the failure of the Senate leadership to schedule promptly floor debates and floor votes on nominees which the
Committee has favorably reported.

e. Nomination and Confirmation
The Miller Commission recently found that the selection process has been
"transformed during the last few decades and become more complicated,"
phenomena which are reflected in increased dependence on "larger staff
operations for screening and investigating potential nominees." 44 These
.modifications, which the entity traced to the Reagan Administration, have
continued during subsequent presidencies.45 The Commission ascertained that
practices have changed in three :fundamental ways: "(l) more attorneys and
resources in the White House and Department of Justice are devoted to
screening potential judicial nominees; (2) extensive interviews with potential
judicial nominees have become routine; and (3) White House staff have become
more involved in the screening and selection process."46 The group also
characterized the three questionnaires which nominees must complete for the
Justice Department, the Judiciary Committee, and the ABA as "symbolic and
illustrative of how the federal judicial appointment process has become
'bureaucratized"' while discovering that "many of the questions asked are
redundant or overlapping" and describing the process of answering the
questionnaires as ''burdensome.''47
A decade ago, the Committee on Federal Courts of the New York City Bar
("City Bar'') conducted a study in which it reached somewhat similar detenninations. The group observed that "[t]here has been substantial delay at the
presidential level in recommending candidates" and found an "inevitable lapse
of time" in the nomination process.48 The City Bar also remarked that "[a]t both
44 Miller Report, supra note 6, at 4.
4S Id.

46 See Id. at 4-5.
See Id. at 6.

47

48

See N.Y. City Bar, supra note 7, at 376.
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the FBI inquizy and Senate Judiciazy Committee hearing stages, judicial appointments are not top priority items" and that the investigation and hearing
phases required two orthreemonths.49
The City Bar stated as well that the "overextended judiciazy can expect little
relief from the shortage of judges," unless those who participate in the appointments process "suddenly and drastically alter their priorities," even while recognizing that a "sense of urgency on the part of all agencies concerned could substantially speed up the selection of judges."so Other observers of the
appointments process have correspondingly perceived that executive and legislative branch officials evince insufficient appreciation of the vacancies problem's critical nature to institute actions which will expedite selection.s1
The City Bar and others have trenchantly admonished those who are
associated with nominations and confirmations that they nmst care:fully strike an
appropriate balance between the need for efficiency and for considered
evaluation of nominees. For example, the bar organization called for the
elimination ofunnecessazy delay and for efforts to facilitate selection, even as it
warned against the danger of "hurried, assembly-line appointments to lifetime
positions of authority of persons ill-suited to be federal judges."s2 The
researchers who performed a 1994 Federal Judicial Center (FJC) study for the
Long Range Planning Committee of the Judicial Conference similarly cautioned
that "an expedited appointments process for judges should not be achieved at
the expense of thoroughness in reviewing the character and abilities of potential
jurists."s3 The National Commission on Judicial Discipline specifically
observed that careful vetting of candidates to guarantee the selection of only the
most well qualified and honest judges might minimize the possibility of
subsequent judicial misconduct and, thus, suggested that FBI investigations be
thorough.s4 A related issue is the increasingly detailed scrutiny which most
participants, but especially the Senate, have recently accorded nominees,
although the question of precisely what level of scrutiny is appropriate has
sparked ongoing, intensive debate and may be insolvable.ss
Id.
Id. at 375.
51 See Bconant et al., supra note 6, at 347.
52
See N.Y. City Bar, supra note 7, at 377.
53 See Bconant et al., supra note 6, at 347; see also Miller Report, supra note 6, at 11 (suggesting that
thcjudicimy's quality is far more important than the time devoted to appointments).
49
50

S4 See REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE AND REMOVAL 81 (1993).
SS See Hartley & Holmes, supra note 27. For a flavor of the debate, compare Bruce Fein, A Circumscribed Senate Conjinnation Role, 102 HARV. L REV. 672 (1989), with Albert P. Melone, The Senate's Con-

538

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[VoL47

It is important as well to understand that nomination and confirmation are
essentially synergistic processes, so that the failure of certain participants to
meet temporal deadlines can seriously affect them and exacerbate delay.56 The
activities of individuals and institutions participating alone and together can be
interdependent, so that the failure by certain of the system's components to meet
temporal deadlines can seriously affect others and exacerbate delay.57 For instance, the simultaneous submission of large numbers of nominees can lead to
the tardy completion of FBI background investigations or ABA qualification
ratings, which could correspondingly postpone the confirmation process.58

f. Limited Prospects for Meaningful Change
Perhaps most salient is that nmch of the delay which attends appointments is
intrinsic and irreducible, although some temporal restraints are unnecessary and
are remediable. Several studies of judicial selection have reached these
conclusions. A 1961 ABA evaluation59 found that an irreducible element of
delay was inherent in the appointments process, ascertaining, for instance, that
three· and a half months was the shortest practicable time for concluding the
nomination phase under ideal conditions and that the average period for
completion of this stage had previously been almost twice as long.60
The New York City Bar more recently expressed serious doubt that the
"average time lag [from opening to confirmation] could ever be reduced
substantially below" eight months, even with the best of intentions and extra
effort and declared that attaining this temporal goal would not resolve the
persistent vacancies difficulty.61 The strikingly insightful Bar determinations
warrant comprehensive quotation:
We have found no single point of delay in the multi-faceted selection
process which, if corrected, would substantially remedy the problem.
Indeed, we have found quite the opposite-with respect to different
candidates delay occurs at different stages. While we consider it
important that unnecessary delays in the appointment system be
finnation Role in Supreme Court Nominations and the Politics of Ideology Versus Impartiality, 15 JUDI·

CATURE 68 {1991).
56 Bcnnant ct al., supra note 6, at 335.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59
86 Reports of the American Bar Ass'n, Report of the Standing Committee on the Federal Judicliuy at
503, 501 (1961).
60
Id.
61 See N.Y. City Bar, supra note 7, at 377.
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eliminated, we see no practical way in which the average time lag of
ten months or more between vacancy and candidate clearance is
likely to be improved appreciably in the foreseeable future.62
The 1994 FJC report's authors additionally observed that most of the
mechanisms which might resolve the persistent vacancies difficulty by increasing efficiency and resources could expedite selection somewhat;63 however, the
measures only partially address certain causes of delay and may merely mitigate
other sources, namely politics. Therefore, conflicts implicating powerful persons and interests could well continue delaying appointments, absent the adoption of a merit selection system that deemphasizes the role of politics, a prospect
which seems quite unlikely.64
Finally, it is important to appreciate that the persistent vacancies problem
has remained essentially unchanged, even though various individuals and entities, especially members of the bench and bar, have been studying and publicizing the difficulty while urging the legislative and executive branches to treat it
for several decades. For example, since 1980, the Judicial Conference has
widely circulated monthly compilations of all openings and of specific vacancies
that constitute judicial emergencies, the Chief Justices and numerous other
judges have actively spoken out on the issue, and the organized bar has periodically addressed the question.65 The New York City Bar aptly summarized these
propositions: "[I]t is a fuct that while calls for greater speed have been made by
the judiciary and bar for decades, there has been only relatively modest improvement in the response time."66
g. Effects ofthe Persistent Vacancies Problem

The permanent openings problem has had many deleterious effects. The
New York City Bar determined that ''vacancies can have a dramatic impact on
the ability of courts to handle their cases," especially in light of the
comparatively few judges across the nation and the tiny number in certain

62 See id. at 382. "But when all is said and done, the process simply cannot be strcamlincd to a point that
the problem ofpersistent vacancies will be eliminated." Id. at 378.
63 See Bcn:nant ct al., supra note 6, at 344.
64 See id.; see also N.Y. City Bar, supra note 7, at 375-77.
65 See, e.g., Ruth Hochbcigcr, Three Bar Presidents Hit Delay in Fi11fng U.S. Cou11 Seats, N.Y.LJ., Apr.
24, 1981, at l; U.S. Conference of Mayors, Bar Presidents Suppo11 Judiciazy, THI! THIRD BRANCH, Aug.
1997, at 9. See generally N.Y. City Bar, supra note 7, at 378.
66 See N.Y. City Bar, supra note 7, at 375.
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specific courts.67 The Bar correspondingly remarked that the openings and
increased filings imposed unwarranted pressure on sitting judges and created
unjustified difficulties for parties which nrust compete for scarce judicial time. 68
The FJC researchers recently ascertained that vacancies had a statistically
significant impact on judges' average workloads for the period encompassing
1970 to 1992. Had the courts been operating at full judicial staffing levels,
appellate and district judges would have realized workload reductions of nine
and ten percent respectively. 69 Indeed, the federal courts currently experience a
backlog of thousands of civil suits, while criminal dockets have effectively
prevented numerous district judges from trying any civil cases during some
years.10

The Miller Commission correspondingly evinced concern that the
cumbersome and prolonged selection procedures impose disadvantages on the
justice process and on possible appointees, intimating that the caliber of the
federal bench could suffer.71 A decade ago, the New York City Bar admonished Congress that continued "[i]naction nrust be weighed against the frustration
of justice resulting from undue delay, and the very real price in public esteem
which nrust be paid by a highly visible judiciary when it is unable to perform its
constitutional mandate in a timely and efficient manner."72 Failure to treat the
longstanding problem could erode the American people's respect for the political
branches.

B. The Current Impasse
The existing difficulty may warrant somewhat less treatment than the
persistent conundrum principally because closeness in time complicates efforts
to appreciate what has actually happened and its ultimate effects. For example,
even though political phenomena are apparently more responsible than the
permanent problem for the current impasse, politics suffuse both, thereby
obscuring their exact interrelationship. Nonetheless, I attempt to provide an

67

See id. at 374.
Id.
Bellllllllt ct al., supra note 6, at 327.
70
See Alliance for Justice Judicial Selection Project Mid-Year Report 4 (1994) (rccouming backlogs);
Conversation with Raymond J. Dcarle, U.S. District Judge, E.D.N.Y. (May 23, 1997) (suggesting criminal
dockets prevent judges from trying civil cases).
71 See Miller Report, supra note 6, at 6.
72 See N.Y. City Bar, supra note 7, at 383.
68
6
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accurate account of recent developments by relying substantially on the actions
and statements of participants.
Numerous political phenomena which attended the appointments process
throughout 1997 contributed significantly to the present dilemma, although certain aspects of the generic problem did implicate selection in that year. The
President and the Senate-including the Majority Leader, the Senate Judiciazy
Committee, its chair and committee members, and specific senators-were primarily responsible for most of the difficulties, These public officials, individually or together, could rectify or ameliorate many of the complications if they
had the political will to do so.
The periods that the Clinton Administration and the Senate needed to complete nomination and confirmation continued to increase during 1997. For example, on average, nominations required more than 600 days, while confirmations consumed a record high of 183 days.73 Most of the delay in the
appointments process obviously kept occurring between the date of vacancy and
nomination.

1. Nomination Process
The failure to appoint additional judges during the last year partially resulted
from delay in submitting nominees. Moreover, the same temporal problems
should be ascribed principally to the Clinton Administration and to individual
senators or other political officials who were to recommend candidates for the
President's consideration. However, other participants, such as Senator Hatch,
Senator Lott and particular Republican senators, probably deserve some blame
for delays because of their specifically-stated needs to treat political concerns
such as ''judicial activism."
The Chief Executive's delays in tendering nominees apparently had some,
albeit comparatively minimal, responsibility for the small number of judicial appointments. In early 1997, President Clinton submitted the names of twenty-two
individuals, many of whom he had nominated during the 104th Congress, several of whom had participated in confirmation hearings, and a few of whom had
73 See Vivcca Novak, Empty-Bench Syndrome, Congressional Republicans Are Determined to Put
Clinton's Judicial Nominees on Hold, TIME, May 26, 1997, at 37; see also Onin G. Hatch, There's No Vacancy Crisis In the Federal Courts, WML sr. J., Aug. 13, 1997, at AlS (claiming confumations require 91
days and nominations require 618 days); Clearing the Bench, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June 17, 1997, at Al6
(reciting similar statistics); supra note 24 and accompanying text {affording comparable data for 1980-1995).
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received :favorable committee votes. 74 Thereafter, the Administration rather
gradually, but steadily and with somewhat increased alacrity, provided additional names. For example, the President forwarded thirteen district court nominees on July 31.75 Virtually all of the nominees seemed to have very strong
professional qualifications, while a significant percentage had prior judicial experience in the federal or state court systems.76 Many of the nominees apparently held moderate political viewpoints, several may have been affiliated with
the Republican Party, and President Bush had appointed a few of them to the
district bench.77
In :fairness, the July package of judicial candidates and the aforementioned
general treatment of nominations illustrate several complications. When, as
here, the President tenders a substantial number of persons at one time,
especially immediately before a Senate recess, the Judiciary Committee may
experience considerable difficulty in smoothly processing the individuals.
President Clinton had submitted the names of only eight new nominees by June,
while Senator Hatch found unacceptable most of the January set of candidates
for the bench, thus enabling the Chair to assert that the Committee had
insufficient names to consider.78

The Administration never tendered nominees for all 100 judicial vacancies,
which would have permitted the Chief Executive to apply greater pressure on the
Judiciary Committee and the Senate. However, President Clinton might have
reasonably assumed that it was unnecessary to forward substantially more
names than Senator Hatch had publicly pronounced on nn.tltiple occasions that
the Committee would process.79 At most relevant times throughout 1997, the
Administration kept before the Committee a larger number of nominees than the
Chair had promised to review. Finally, President Clinton probably had to
74 The White House, Office of the Press Sec'y, President Clinton Nominates 1Wenty-two to the Federal
Bench (Jan. 7, 1997).
75 The White House, Office of the Press Sec'y, President Clinton Nominates Thirteen to the Federal

Bench (July 31, 1997).
76 See, e.g., 143 CONG. REC. 85653 (daily ed. June 16, 1997) (statcmcllt of Sen. Leahy); Sheldon Goldman & Elliot Slotnick, Clinton's First Tenn Judiciary: Many Bridges to Cross, 80 JUDICATURE 254 (1997);
Carl Tobias, Filling the Federal Courts in an Election Year, 49 SMU L. REV. 309, 315 (1996).
77 See, e.g., Goldman & Slotnick, supra note 76; Sbaunan P. Duffy, Clinton Announces Nominees for
Eastern District Court, LEOALim'Ell!OENCE, Aug. 4, 1997, at 1.
78 See Hatch, supra note 73; see also Neil A. Lewis, Keeping Track: Vacant Federal Judgeships, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 11, 1997, at Al2.
79 The Chair said that he would follow an approach similar to that used in the 104th Congress, whereby
one appeals court, and four or five district, court nominees testified at one hearing each mollth that the Senate
was in session. See infra note 84 and accompanying text.
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balance the need for expedition with cautious review of candidates' abilities,
character, and political viability because nominees who prove to be
controversial, nmch less incompetent or dishonest, can erode the
Administration's credibility and may even slow, halt, or damage the selection

process.
Individual Democratic senators or other political figures from the geographic
areas in which vacancies arose who were to recommend names for the President's consideration seemingly had greater responsibility than the Chief Executive for the delays that attended the submission of nominees for a number of
openings during 1997. The Republican leadership, but principally GOP senators, also contributed to delays which accompanied the tendering of names for
these and other judgeships that were vacant in 1997.
Many reasons, some of which were generic and a few of which may have
been specific to the locales, could have prevented particular senators or other
political officials from expeditiously suggesting potential nominees to the
President For instance, in a number of states that lacked two Democratic
senators, identifying those political par1y figures who were to forward the
recommendations or treating Republican senators' demands that they be
involved consumed considerable time. Illustrative are Arizona and Washington,
whose GOP senators have insisted that they be permitted to participate in
choosing the candidates and even that they are entitled to propose nominees.80
The Administration may have been responsible for some delay in submitting
nominees.81 Insofar as the Executive Branch could have coordinated efforts to
encourage senators or other political leaders to fornntlate promptly their recommendations for the President, officials with this responsibility might have done
too little or have been delayed by the "start-up" costs inherent in creating a second presidential Administration. For example, the White House Counsel, Jack
Quinn, resigned soon after President Clinton's re-election, while ongoing
Whitewater investigations and numerous additional duties may have distracted
many attorneys in that office. The Administration consumed nmch of 1997 attempting to fill the Deputy and Associate Attorney General positions held by
80 See, e.g., Peter Callaghan, Senators Agree on Selecting Judges, TACOMA NEWS TRIBUNE, Aug. 12,
1997, at Bl; Neil A. Lewis, Clinton Has a Chance to Shape the Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 1997, at 30; see
also 143 CONG. REC. S2538, S2541 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1997) (statement of Sen. Biden) (suggesting GOP
senatoIS may have SO intimated).
81 See Helen Dewar, Conjinnation Process Frustrates President; Clinton Wants Senate GOP to Pick Up
Pace, WASH. POST, July 25, 1997, at A21; Greg Pierce, Clinton vs. Clinton, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 12, 1997, at
A6; President's Counsel Quits, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1996, at B22.
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Jamie Gorelick and John Schmidt at the Justice Department, which meant that
Attorney General Janet Reno and other Department personnel spent relatively
little time on judicial selection.
To the extent that delay in tendering nominees did not result from the failure
of senators or other political figures to suggest names but rather from the fuilure
of the Administration to submit nominees, the phenomena described in the paragraph above may explain nmch of this delay. For instance, the time which the
Justice Department committed to replacing its second and third ranking officers
might have detracted from important judicial selection activities, such as identifying and interviewing candidates or consulting with the Judicialy Committee on
the nominees Some delay in submitting nominees also appears attributable to
the Administration's perception that it .lIDlSt cooperate with, assuage, or placate
the GOP leadership or specific Republican senators.
In :fitlrness, very real practical and political restraints may limit the Chief
Executive's capacity to expedite nominee submission. For instance, the
President might only be able to cajole senators who make recommendations
because he may need their future support or because he may wish to avoid the
perception of interfering in essentially local political matters. President Clinton
may have even less ability to secure help from GOP leaders or Republican
senators because he may require their future assistance, the senators have few
incentives for cooperating, and neither side will want to appear weak. The Chief
Executive might also be unwilling to expend scarce political capital on judicial
selection.
2. ABA Committee

Throughout the 104th Congress, the ABA Committee maintained its
conventional role of rating candidates' qualifications as it had for the last four
decades. 82 Senator Hatch expressed growing concern about the ABA' s
participation. During 1997, the Chair abruptly terminated the Association's
official responsibility in the confinnation process. 83 Because the ABA has
traditionally played a large role in helping various Administrations ascertain the
advisability of proceeding with specific candidates, the Association may
continue to exercise considerable influence, although its future impact,
particularly on the confirmation process, remains unclear.
82 See Tcny Carter, A Conservative Juggernaut, A.B.A. J., June 1997, at 32.
Carter, supra note 82; N. Lee Cooper, Standing Up to Critical Scrutiny, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1997, at 6.
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3. Confirmation Process
The Senate Judiciary Committee bears some responsibility for delay in the
appointment of judges, principally through its :failure to investigate, conduct
hearings for, and vote on, more nominees. The Committee Chair typically held a
hearing at which one appeals court and four or five district court nominees testified each month that the 104th Congress was in session, and he promised to follow a similar approach during 1997.84 However, the Committee did not adhere
assiduously to that schedule; the Senate had confirmed only nine judges by early
September 1997. Senator Joseph Biden (D-Del.), who chaired the Committee
from 1987 until 1994, recently claimed that the Committee had conducted two
hearings each month during his tenure.85
This dearth of appointments appears partly attributable to the inadequate
resources which the Committee committed to judicial selection and partly to
political :factors, some of which could be ascribed to Senator Hatch and others to
his Republican colleagues. For example, Senator Hatch resolved the
longstanding controversy over the ABA's participation,86 while all of the GOP
senators participated in a lengthy and sometimes acrimonious debate over the
roles of the Committee, its Chair, and individual senators in judicial selection,
which essentially culminated in a decision to maintain the status quo. 87 The
resolution of these disputes consumed time that otherwise might have been
devoted to judicial selection.

The Clinton Administration shares the responsibility for the small number of
judges confirmed because, early in the congressional session, it tendered
relatively few nominees-a significant percentage of whom Senator Hatch
deemed unacceptable-and provided other names irregularly, possibly
complicating efficacious Committee processing. Nonetheless, the Chair's claim
that the Executive Branch supplied insufficient nominees lacks persuasiveness.
At least as much of the delay seems attributable to the Committee's inability or
reluctance to hold hearings for, and vote on, nominees, as well as specific
senators' opposition to certain judicial can-didates.

84 See Carl Tobias, Choosing Federal Judges In the Second Clinton Administration, 24
CONST. L.Q. 741 (1997) {"Tobias, Choosing Federal Judges").
85 See 143 CONG. REC. 82538, 82539 {daily ed. Mar. 19, 1997) {statement of Sen. Biden).
86 See supra note 83 and accompanying text

HAsTINGS

87 See Neil A. Lewis, Move to Limit Clinton's Judicial Choices Fails, N.Y. 'DMES, Apr. 30, 1997, at
D22; Obstruction ofJustice, TIIENEWREPUBUC, May 19, 1997, at 9.
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In fuirness, individuals who exercise substantial state power and enjoy life
tenure nmst receive careful investigation and analysis in an attempt to insure
that they possess the requisite qualifications and character to be excellent
judges. Moreover, it is difficult to strike an appropriate balance between the
need for both serious scrutiny and expeditious selection. Senator Hatch bas
specifically asserted that he prefers to exercise care in discharging that
important duty, 83 although caution seemingly contributed less than political
fuctors to delay in the confirmation process. Furthermore, Senator Hatch may
have experienced a conflict between the obligation to follow and implement
Senate traditions and the responsibility to his more conservative Republican
colleagues, certain of whom apparently feel less disposed to honor those
conventions, particularly when concerned about appointing activist judges.
After all, the Chair successfully resisted a challenge that could have
significantly modified certain senatorial understandings which govern
appointments. 89 , Senator Hatch bas processed a number of nominees, even
castigating his GOP colleagues for opposing several individuals, while the 1997
confirmation record is similar to some compiled for comparable periods during
prior congressional sessions.w

The Senate Majority Leader and the Republican Party leadership seem to
have great responsibility for the delay in naming judges. The Senate bad
confirmed only nine nominees before September 1997, although the Judiciaxy
Committee bad approved and sent significantly more names to the floor, a
dynamic that resembles Republican processing of judicial candidates during the
1996 election year.91 Some delay in placing nominees who have received
fuvorable Committee treatment on the Senate calendar and conducting floor
debate and votes on them is understandable given the pressure of other important
legislative business, such as budgetary matters, and the chamber's unanimous
consent procedure, which enables a single senator to delay the entire body and
even block its consideration of candidates.

88

See Hatch, supra note 73, at Al5.
See supra note 88 and accompanying text; see also Neil A. Lewis, Republicans Seek Greater Influence
in Naming Judges, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 1997, at 1.
90
See, e.g., 143 CONG. REC. 82515, 82536 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1997) (statement of Sen. Hatch); see also
Ted Gest & Lewis Lord, The GOP's Judicial Freeze-A Fight to See Who Rules over the Law, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., May 26, 1997, at 23; Novak, supra note 73, at 38. But see supra notes 84-85 and accompanying
89

text.

91 See 143 CONG. REC. S8041, S8045 (daily ed. July 24, 1997) (statement of Sen. Leahy); Hatch, supra
note 73, at Al5.
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Nevertheless, the small number ofjudges who secured confirmation in 1997,
especially as compared with earlier sessions of Congress, suggests that considerable responsibility lies with the Senate majority's leadership and its :failure to
schedule floor votes promptly. At the outset of the 105th Congress, Senator Lott
vowed that he would subject President Clinton's nominees to close scrutiny.92
In the spring, Senator Patrick Leahy (D-Vt), the ranking minority member of
the Judiciary Committee, and his Democratic colleagues, such as Senator Biden
and Senator Paul Sarbanes (D-Md.), apparently attempted to cajole Senator Lott
by infonning the Senate that Democrats had expedited appointments during Republican Administrations and imploring the Senate to permit debate and floor
votes on nominees. For example, Senator Biden stated that "everyone who is
nominated is entitled to have a shot ... to be heard on the floor and have a vote
on the floor," while Senator Sarbanes claimed that Republicans would "not even
let [nominees] be considered by the Senate for an up-or-down-vote."93 During
June, the Senate Majority Leader reportedly said that he would not act on any
nominations until the President filled four vacancies on the Federal Election
Commission.94 Senator Leahy responded by reciting a litany of noncontroversial
nominees for vacancies on courts in desperate straits, who had "strong bipartisan support" and ''were unanimously reported to the full Senate by the Judiciary
Committee," three of whom President Clinton had nominated in the spring of
1996.95

4. Nomination and Confirmation
Most of the problems involving nomination and confirmation examined in
the above description of the persistent vacancy difficulty96 attended judicial selection during 1997. For instance, the Justice Department, the Judiciary Committee, and the ABA continued to employ separate questionnaires which included many similar requests. The sporadic pace of nominee submission and
Judiciary Committee review evidence inadequate understanding of the vacancy
dilennna's seriousness and insufficient appreciation for synergy's effects, which
compounded delay.97
92

See Lewis, supra note 80, at 30.
93 See 143 CONG. REc. 82538, 82541 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1997) (statement of Sen. Biden); id. at 82539
(sta!c:mcnt of Sen. Saibancs).
94 See 143 CONG. REC. 85653, 85653 (daily ed. June 16, 1997) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
95 Id. Senator Lott also n:maincd ncuttal in the debate over the role of the Judiciaiy Committee and its
chair. See supra note 87 and accompanying tcrt
96 See supra notes 7-72 and accompanying tcrt
97 See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying tcrt
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Numerous observers of judicial selection. including some senators, have
suggested or asserted that nmch of the current impasse is attributable to motivations that are essentially political, and even to concerns about the ideological
views of nominees. For example, Senator Biden intimated that Republican
senators' opposition to the perceived political perspectives of specific nominees
fostered some delay and accused certain GOP senators of attempting to change
the "last 200 years of tradition" which govern appointments.98 He remarked on
the Senate floor that Republican senators are "trying to keep the President of the
United States :from being able to appoint judges, particularly as it relates to the
courts ofappeals."99 Senator Paul Sarbanes echoed Senator Biden's sentiments
about the Senate's "heavy politicizing of the judicial confirmation process" and
commended Biden because he had "stripped away the veneer and laid out what
is goitu? on behind the scenes, which is a complete departure :from past practices."100
Other experts on judicial selection have made similar remarks. Professor
Sheldon Goldman, who has studied the appointments process for a quartercentury, stated that Republicans have thrown down the political gauntlet to
President Clinton. adding that "[i]n all of American history there has never been
a situation where a newly elected President has meed this kind of challenge to
his judicial nominations." 101 Professor Geoffrey Stone, a respected constitutional law scholar and Provost of the University of Chicago, characterized the
Republicans' actions as a "scandalous and stunningly irresponsible use of the
Senate's authority." 102 Additional writers have commented that "Congress has
insisted on playing an unprecedented role" in selection and that the "Republican
Senate is demanding-and often getting-a voice in whom Clinton appoints to
the district courts."103
Another initiative which some observers consider political and which has
apparently contributed to the present dilemma and caused delay is the effort of
Senator Charles Grassley (R-Iowa) to analyze judicial resources in the federal
courts, especially the appeals courts. 104 For example, in 1996, Senator Grassley
circulated questionnaires to all federal judges seeking infonnation on how the
98 143 CONG. REC. 82538, 82541 (daily cd Mar. 19, 1997) (statement of Sen. Biden).
99 Id. at S2538 (statement of Sen. Bidcn).
lOO Id. at 82539 (statement of Sen. Sarbancs).
101 See Gest & Lord, supra note 90, at 24.
102 See id.
103 See id.
lG4 See Tobias, Filling the Federal Courts in an Election Year, supra note 76.
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officers spend their time. 105 He has also conducted hearings on the allocation
and use ofjudicial resources in several appellate courts, particularly to ascertain
whether those circuits need additional judges or even require the complements
which they now have. 106 Senator Grassley and a number of his colleagues have
opposed :filling a currently-authorized judgeship on the influential United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit107 Controversy
surrounding this issue substantially delayed the confirmation of Merrick
Garland for another opening on that court, and the Senate made his recent
approval contingent on the contested seat remaining empty. 108
No one disputes that the proper deployment of judicial resources in the
courts is a legitimate and important Senate concem However, Senator
Grassley' s initiative may have delayed judicial appointments, especially in the
appellate courts which are experiencing a high percentage of vacancies and
numerous judicial emergencies.109 Moreover, nearly all of the regional circuits
continue to confront expanding numbers of appeals. It is also important to
remember that Congress has created no additional judgeships since 1990, even
though the Judicial Conference has recommended that Congress authorize many
more, a suggestion premised on expert, conservative judgments and
systematically collected empirical data regarding dockets and workloads.11°
Senator Biden aptly summarized these ideas on the Senate floor:
[T]he courts come back to us and say----and they do this in a very
scientific way-we not only need the vacancies filled, we need more
judges than we have . . . . [T]hey cite the backlog, they give the rationale that cases are being backed up .... [T]his is the first time in
.•. 24 years ... I have ever heard anybody come to the floor and
say: You know, we should basically decommissionjudgeships. m

lOS See, e.g., Appellate Survey Results Released, nm THIRD BRANCH, June 1996, at 5; Bruce Brown,
Grassley Has Judges Grousing, AM. LAW., Mar. 1996, at 16.
106 See, e.g., Considering the Appropriate Allocation of Judgeships in the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the
Fourth, F"rllh, and Eleventh Circuits: Hcariiig!l Before the Subconun. on Admin. Oversight and the Courts of the
Senate Comm. on the JudicilllY (Feb. 5, 1997 & June 9, 1997).
107 143 CONG. REC. 82515-82541 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1997); see also Lewis, supra note 80, at 30; Eva M.
Rodriguez, Garland: A Centrist Choice, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 7, 1995, at 6.
lOS 143 CONG. REC. S251S-S2541 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1997).
l09 Twenty-two of 179 judgeships arc vacant. See Judicial Boxscore, nm THIRD BRANCH, Feb. 1998, at
7.
no See Tobias, Choosing Federal Judges, supra note 84, at 753 (characterizing these statistics as conservative); see also S. 678, 105th Cong. (1997) (providi!lgjudgeship bill); Tobias, New Cerliorarl, supra note 18,
at 1271 (providi!lg Confi:rcncc recommendation).
lll 143 CONG. REC. 82538, 82540 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1997) (statement of Sen. Bidcn).
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Numerous actions of Republican senators described earlier support the accusation that the existing conundrum and delays are politically motivated, especially out of concern about the perceived ideological views of nominees. One
illustration is the aborted attempt to modify the traditional responsibility of the
Senate Judiciary Committee and its Chair in the confirmation process. 112 Another is the substantial percentage of vacancies on the appeals courts, which Republican senators apparently view as more important than district courts because
appellate rulings govern entire regions and circuits effectively serve as courts of
last resort for those areas. 113

5. Prospects for Change
lnsofur as the numerous political phenomena which accompanied judicial
selection in 1997 and contributed significantly to the current impasse are
inherent in the process, they may be resistant to treatment For instance, the
above examination of the persistent vacancies problem indicates that .measures
which increase efficiency and resources might only ameliorate the delay which
is attributable to political considerations.114 However, the analysis of political
:fuctors which comprise the present conundrum suggests that public officials
could remedy them, if they exercised the requisite political will. For example,
political concerns are all which seem to prevent President Clinton from
expeditiously submitting additional nominees with comparatively moderate
political viewpoints and Republican senators from promptly confirming those
individuals or other similar existing nominees.

6. Effects ofthe Current Impasse
The current dilemma has caused problems, most of which resemble the
adverse effects that can be ascribed to the persistent vacancies problem 115 For
instance, the present difficulty has imposed analogous pressures on judges and
litigants which are reflected in judicial workload statistics. The federal system
continues to have a substantial civil backlog, whereby "[c]ountless civil
disputes involving business and :fumilies ... are being held up for months," 116
112

See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying tcxt.

113 This happens because the Supreme Court reviews so few appellate decisions.

See Lewis, supra note 87,

atD22.
114 See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying tcxt.
115

See supra notes 66-71 and accompanying text.
See Gest & Loi:d, supra note 90, at 23; see also Robert Sclnnidt, The Costs ofJudicial Delay, Li!OAL
TIMES, Apr. 28, 1997, at 6.
116
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while burgeoning appeals and growing vacancies in nearly one-third of the
Ninth Circuit's judgeships have recently compelled the court to cancel 600
arguments. 117 In July 1997, Senator Leahy claimed that the country has federal
"courts where prosecutors have to kick cases out, that they have to plea bargain
and everything else because there are not enough judges to hear them." 118
Indeed, during mid-July, the "looming crisis in the Nation brought on by the
extraordinary number of vacant federal judicial positions and the resulting
proble~ that are associated with delayed judicial appointments" led the
presidents of seven national legal groups to write an open letter to the Chief
Executive and the Senate Majority Leader. 119 They beseeched the "President
and the Senate to devote the time and resources necessary to expedite [judicial]
selection and confirmation'' urging "all participants in the process to move
quickly to resolve the issues that have resu1ted in these numerous and
longstanding vacancies in order to preserve the integrity of our justice
system."120 The organized bar leadership warned: "The injustice of this
situation for all of society cannot be overstated. Dangerously crowded dockets,
suspended civil case dockets, burgeoning criminal caseloads, overburdened
judges, and chronically under-manned courts undermine our democracy and
respect for the supremacy of law." 121 These sentiments testify to the profound
effects that empty judgeships have on the lives of millions of individual citizens
in the United States.
Insofar as the American people attribute the existing dilennm to partisan
politics, the troubled judicial selection process may engender public disrespect
for the federal government, especially the President and the Senate. The bar
leadership's concerns trenchantly attest to this phenomenon,122 as does Senator
Leahy's assertion that senatorial failure to vote on nominees "damage[s] the integrity and the independence of the federal judiciary ... [and] the U.S. Senate."123

117 See Chronic Federal Judge Shortage Puts lives. Justice on Hold, LAs ~GAS REV. J., Aug. 13, 1997,
at 9A <:'Chronic Sho11age"); Novak, supra note 73, at 37; see also Chronic Shortage, supra (stating that the
6th Cin:uit canceled sixty oral mgumcnts); Bill Kisliuk, Judges' Conference Slams Circuit-Splitting, Vacandes, Tm! RECORDER, Aug. 19, 1997, at 1.
US 143 CONG. REC. S8041, S8045 (daily ed. July 24, 1997) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
119 Letter to President WtlliamJ. Clinton & Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott, ftom N. Lee Cooper, ABA
President, et al. (July 14, 1997) reprinted in 143 CONG. REC. at S8046 (daily ed. July 24, 1997).
120 Id.
121 Id.

l22 See supra notes 119-21 and accompanying tc:Kt.
123 143 CONG. REc. 85653, 85654 (daily ed. June 16, 1997) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
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The exact nature of the current conundrum and who has primary responsibility for the situation remain unclear and controversial, while efforts to resolve
these issues may prove inconclusive and unnecessary, principally because it is
preferable to devote energy to improving the circumstances. For example, the
number and length of open judgeships which the federal court system is experiencing may not constitute a ''vacancies crisis" in the sense that the quantity of
open seats and the time for which they have been empty is unprecedented. Nevertheless, the conditions in specific courts, such as the Ninth Circuit, and for
particular judgeships, namely those with numerous judicial emergencies, are
vezy serious.
Assigning precise responsibility for the situation today seems similarly
difficult and unproductive. For instance, the earlier evaluation revealed that
each of the major participants in the appointments process could probably have
instituted .measures which would have expedited selection. However, at this
juncture, it would be more profitable to concentrate on ending the impasse and
facilitating appointments.
In sum, the above examination of the generic openings problem and the present impasse demonstrates that the two components alone, but especially together, seriously threaten the federal criminal and civil justice systems as well as
warrant expeditious treatment The next Section of this Article explores potential responses to the pennanent difficulty and the recent impasse.

II. ANALYSIS OF POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM
This Section assesses a wide range of possible solutions to the conundrum of
unfilled judicial vacancies that officials in the three branches could implement 124 I evaluate these measures, certain of which might prove more productive in various combinations, primarily in terms of their comparative efficacy for
expediting appointments. The earlier discussion demonstrated that the persistent
problem is partially, and the current impasse is principally, a political problem 125 The successful treatment of these political phenomena depends substantially on political willingness to address them conscientiously, while nmch of the
delay implicating the longstanding complication is intrinsic and cannot be remedied easily. Therefore, I analyze the possibilities ofreducing caseloads or expediting the disposition of litigants' suits. Finding the prospects minimal, I briefly
124 See supra note 8.
125 See supra notes 62-63, 73-82 and accompanying text
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consider mechanisms which respond to the openings' effects, rather than their
causes.

A. Measures to Expedite the Filling of Vacancies
1. The Traditional Appointments Process
a. A Preliminary Word About the Need for Expedition
The prior assessment showed that every individual and entity involved in
judicial selection must view the task as a critical one which demands prompt
performance.126 Indeed, the FJC study's authors stated that "[i]n the final
analysis, a positive attitude and commitment from all three branches-a sense of
urgency whenever a vacancy arises-will speed the process most reliably." 127
Moreover, constant reminders to executive and legislative branch officials and
to the public, emanating principally from the judiciary which "has felt the
urgency on a daily basis,"128 have been helpful and should continue.
However, the above analysis also suggested that the inherent nature of nmch
of the delay, given the need for careful nominee scrutiny and the number of participants in the selection process, may preclude elimination of the persistent vacancies problem. 129 The Chief Executive and Congress appear unlikely to modify their priorities significantly and the lay public is essentially indifferent 130
Thus, although the Judicial Branch should do all that it can to publicize and increase public awareness of the vacancies' crucial impact on court operations and
"jawboning'' by others must proceed, it is important to be realistic about the
limited prospects for success.

b. Expediting the Selection ofJudicial Nominees
i.

Insuring greater time for nominee selection through timely
notice ofvacancies and advance processing

Studies have shown that the most substantial temporal delays in filling vacant judgeships can be attributed to the process of identifying and assessing the
fitness for judicial service of possible nominees. 131 Thus, if the designation and
126

See supra Part L
See Bcn:nant ct al., supra note 6, at 347.
Id.; see also N.Y. City Bar, supra note 7, at 377-78.
See supra notes 7-72 and accompanying tc:ict.
See N.Y. City Bar, supra note 7, at 378; supra notes 48-51 and accompanying tc:ict.
131 See LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 20, at 104-05; Bcawmt et al., supra note 6, at 333-35.

127
128
129
130
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evaluation of potential candidates were routinely begun before openings occurred, the period during which courts are required to :function without full complements of active judges might be significantly decreased.
Many federal judges make decisions about changes in their active status
nmch before the date when they are eligible to become senior judges or to retire.132 These comprise the most frequent reasons for judicial openings, although
some judges premise these determinations on unanticipated events, such as sudden sickness, disability, or other changes in their personal circumstances. During 1988, the Judicial Conference recognized the need for judges to give advance notice of changes in status and implored them to do so; numerous judges
have afforded such notice, but some have not 133
Advance notice of six to twelve months before an anticipated assumption of
senior status or retirement will expedite the appointment of replacements in several ways. First, it will specifically inform officers in the Executive and Legislative Branches with responsibility for judicial selection of the impending need
for an appointment Second, notice will offer bar associations, civic groups, and
others that are interested in participating in the selection process opportunities to
encourage and aid the President and the Senate in expeditiously naming a new
judge.
A few disadvantages may attend the implementation of this approach.
Advance notice of "anticipated" retirements is an incomplete solution because
unpredictable developments occasion some changes in status.134 Even for
certain openings which are foreseeable, several factors may preclude the
appointment of replacements before vacancies occur. For example, advance
notice requires voluntary cooperation from judicial officers who might be
unwilling to reveal their retirement decisions early. Of course, Congress could
condition changes in status on notice; however, the unanticipated nature of many
retirement decisions make this idea impractical.
The Administrative Office or court officials, such as the custodian ofjudicial
records, might give notice when judges approach a specified time, such as six or
twelve months, before they become eligible to assume senior status or retire. 135
One problem with this alternative is its potential for imposing undue pressure on
132 For a helpful explanation of the rules governing changes of status, sec Bcmiant ct al., supra note 6, at
334 & n.42; see also 28 U.S.C. § 371 (1994).
133 Supra notes 29-30 and accompanying tc:xt.
134
LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 20, at 103-04; Bconant ct al., supra note 6, at 334.
135
Bconant ct al., supra note 6, at 333-34.
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judges to modify status immediately upon becoming eligible and thus
contravening the traditional understanding that retirements are voluntary.136 The
independence of Article ill judges correspondingly indicates that many jurists
may feel free to ignore the notice, absent some regulatozy predicate.
A related measure could obviate certain difficulties recounted above. 137
Congress might provide for the creation of an additional judgeship on the date
when an incumbent judge becomes eligible for senior status, even if that judicial
officer were not to assume senior status at that time. The number of judgeships
authorized would then be decreased by one when. the incumbent takes senior
status, retires, or dies, if the new position has been filled by that date. This
alternative enables participants, especially Executive Branch officials and
senators, to :fucilitate the selection of nominees, many more of whom would
assume office on the date that incumbents are eligible to alter their status.

ii. Establishing more formalized processes for nominee selection
Ifmore regularized, consistent, and synchronized procedures for identifying,
screening, and assessing judicial nominees are implemented and if greater fiscal
and personnel resources are committed to all phases of the selection process, the
individuals and entities involved in choosing judges could reach prompter, and
perhaps improved, decisions, thereby decreasing the time during which
judgeships remain unfilled. 138 Those who participate in designating, vetting, and
evaluating judicial candidates might implement specific measures that would
increase the routinization, uniformity, coordination, and efficiency of nominee
selection and therefore enhance the current procedures whereby a number of
candidates are chosen through diverse, unsystematic, and even idiosyncratic
processes to which inadequate resources have been committed.139

(A) Initial Selection Process
lnso:fur as specific members of the Senate recommend candidates to the
President for nomination, senators might implement several measures that could
expedite the initial phase of the selection process. Effectuation of these
suggestions is particularly important in those courts which have substantial
caseloads and numerous judges and, thus, rather frequent openings because
136 Id.
137 See Miller Report, supra note 6, at 10.
138 See BeII111111t et al., supra note 6, at 335-36.
139
See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
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prolonged vacancies in their judgeships can be especially detrimental to the
admjnjstration ofjustice.
Senators should identify and promptly vet candidates within thirty days and
suggest these names to the President within ninety days of a vacancy arising. 140
Members of the Senate also ought to recommend at least two names in order of
preference to minimize delays should a candidate become unavailable or
undesirable. If senators entertain doubts about specific individuals or believe
that their candidacies may prove controversial, the senators could confer with
Executive Branch officials or the Senate Judiciary Connnittee about their
concerns. Senators can implement these suggestions by expanding their reliance
on connnissions or staffs to compile and maintain lists of highly qualified
potential nominees and by connnitting the requisite resources to the investigation
and assessment of candidates' qualifications.
Numerous members of the Senate may be reluctant to effectuate certain of
these suggestions. For example, some senators may consider the recommendation of more than one candidate unnecessary or an interference with conventional senatorial understandings. Other members of the Senate, particularly
those from states which experience infrequent vacancies, may correspondingly
find the collection and maintenance of candidate compilations and the devotion
of more resources to investigating and evaluating possible nominees unwarranted or wasteful
(B) Subsequent Process

Executive Branch officials, alone or in conjunction with the ABA, should
effectuate certain measures to expedite nominee selection. Administration
officers who are responsible for choosing judges should encourage senators to
forward their recommendations promptly. They should also seek input from the
senators on candidates, such as those for appeals court seats, whom the
President traditionally selects; and they should consult with individual senators
and the Judiciary Committee to facilitate appointments. 141
Administration officials as well should create and maintain compilations of
prospective candidates for the appellate and district court benches. This would
140 Miller Report, supra note 6, at 6-7.
141 For a discussion of the consultation process, see 143 CONG. REC. S2538, S2541 (daily ed. Mar. 19,
1997) (statement of Sen. Bidcn); Tobias, Choosing Federal Judges, supra note 84, at 744; Williams, supra
note 7, at 193 & n.41.
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enable the President to inform senators who are unresponsive to requests for
multiple names of others whom the Chief Executive is considering; this should prompt the choice and nomination of very competent candidates and reduce
delays if prior selections prove undesirable. The President may correspondingly consult these lists in considering his own selections when members of the
Senate mil to recommend candidates within ninety days of a vacancy occurring.
Numerous senators, however, may resist Administration invocation of these
mechanisms because they trench too substantially on traditional senatorial
prerogatives.
The White House, the Justice Department, the FBI, and the ABA should
conclude their investigations of possible nominees within ninety days of the date
on which senators recommend the individuals. These entities can comply with
this suggestion by devoting greater financial and other resources to their efforts
or by simplifying the procedures employed. All of these institutions, especially
the White House and the Department of Justice, nmst reassess and attempt to
streamline existing processes, focusing on the breadth and depth of candidate
questioning, the elimination of duplicative inquiries, and the necessity of personal interviews.
Some redundancy in the efforts of White House officials, Justice Department
lawyers, the FBI, and the ABA may be unavoidable; however, each participant
in the judicial selection process should attempt to assume more specific, narrower responsibilities. 142 For instance, the FBI could restrict its investigation to
issues involving "personal and financial integrity, health and similar matters
within its particular expertise."143 The ABA might confine its inquiry toquestions implicating professional competence and experience which members of its
Committee are better suited to assess.144 White House and Justice Department
officials should consider eschewing interviews for most candidates because
these officers can typically rely on interviews conducted by the FBI and the
ABA and should request that the Bureau and the Bar Association provide supplemental infoIIDation when necessary. 145

142 The Miller Commission found that both the munbc:r of participants and the scope of inteIViews had
grown, but questioned the need and relevance of the inteIViews themselves. This led the commission to suggest
limilillg the nmnbcr ofparticip3Jlts and the scope of interviews. See Miller Report, supra note 6, at 3-10.
143 See id. at 8.
144 Id. at 8-9.
145 I premise the above ideas substautially on the Miller Commission's observations regarding the efficacy
ofinterviews. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
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The ABA should consider implementing some of the Miller Commission's
recommendations. 146 The Commission suggested that the ABA Committee
furnish the Administration and the Senate Judiciary Committee with brief
explanations of the reasons for its ratings of nominees' qualifications. These
statements would assist Executive Branch officials, senators, and the public in
understanding the Committee's perspectives and enable the ABA to deflect the
allegation that it considers ideological or political factors in rating nominees. 147
The Miller Commission also proposed that the ABA enlarge the Committee to
include more than one representative from each circuit so that the entity can
conclude its investigations within thirty days.148
Insofar as the current impasse can be ascribed to delay in forwarding nominees, the President must devote greater resources to the selection process. Additional people and money will expedite the submission of recommendations
from senators and other political :figures by resolving disputes over specific vacancies, Administration review of those candidates, and the choice and nomination of particular nominees.
The Chief Executive might consider tendering names for all current vacancies. This would enable him to deflect the frequently-leveled criticism that the
dearth of nominees available for Judiciary Committee processing delayed appointments in 1997.149 The President must at least insure that the Administration always supplies the Committee with more nominees than its Chair promises
to process.150

c. Expediting the Senate Confirmation Process for Judicial Nominees
The Senate Judiciary Committee must seriously consider means of improving
the traditional confirmation process. One important action which it might
institute is the devotion of additional fiscal and other resources to the
investigation and assessment of nominees. For example, the Miller Commission
suggested that the Committee enlarge the number of staff lawyers who
investigate candidates and continue the practice of borrowing Justice

146 Miller Report, supra note 6, at 7-8.
147
See id.; see also supra notes 38-42, 83-84 and i:ccompanying text
148
See Miller Report, supra note 6, at 8.
149 See supra notes 73-74, 89 and accompanying text
ISO The Administration could expedite nomination and confumation by consulting in advance with the Judicialy Committee, its Chair, and individual senators. See supra note 141.
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Department personnel when the Committee needs assistance in processing
substantial numbers of pending nominees.151
The Judiciary Committee could also examine ways of effecting
corresponding economies. For instance, the Committee might forgo confirmation hearings for noncontroversial nominees as these hearings are
essentially ceremonial and scheduling them :further delays the confirmation
process, a problem that the increasing frequency ofvacancies compounds. 152
Insofilr as the present conundrum. is attributable to a delayed confirmation
process, some problelll<) seemingly result from the Judiciary Committee's inability to investigate, conduct hearings for, and vote on nominees; the Senate
Majority Leader's :fu.ilure to schedule floor votes; and specific senators' opposition to certain nominees. In addition to implementing the above reforms, the
Committee could correspondingly process greater numbers of nominees by
scheduling more frequent hearings or by eliminating hearings for noncontroversial nominees. The chair, alone or in conjunction with Administration officials,
might attempt to facilitate the resolution of disputes over particular candidates
and over how candidates are reconnnended for the President's consideration in
specific states, although these may be sensitive, burdensome assignments. For
instance, Senator Hatch could promote efforts to seek candidates whom senators
would find acceptable, such as the recent initiative in Washington state, or the
compromise which facilitated filling of the long-term appellate court vacancy in
Arizona.153

The Senate Majority Leader and the Republican leadership nmst insure that
they expeditiously schedule for floor votes nominees whom the Judiciary Committee approves, perhaps by assigning the confirmation process higher priority.
lnsofilr as the controversial nature of some nominations has contributed to delays in scheduling, the leadership should. promptly address those disputes which
are amenable to resolution and, :fu.iling that, afford opportunities for full debate
and votes on nominees.

151 See Miller Report, supra note 6, at 9. The Commission also suggested that the Committee be required
to clear nominees within sixty days of receipt Id. The Committee and its Chair might resist this idea.
152 See supra Part LA.2.d.
1S3 See, e.g., Arizonan Gets 9th Circuit Seat, Tm! TUCSON CITIZl!N, Jan. 30, 1998, at 2C; Callaghan, supra note 80; D. Michael Heywood, UPS Worlcer.s' Fight For Jobs Feels Familiar, Hatch Sniffs al Reno's Pitch

forMoreJudges, TH!!COLUMBIAN,Aug. 7, 1997,atBlO.
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d. Miscellaneous Measures for Expediting the Nomination and
Co11firmation Process
i. A recapitulation on temporal prescriptions
AB mentioned above, the creation of fixed time periods within which
nominations and confirmations must occur, though not legally binding, would
probably yield some bene:fits. 154 Were the organized bar, national political
leaders and the media to recognize time limits, this could emphasize the
significance of judicial appointments and engender public expectations that
openings be promptly filled. Particular guidelines or benchmarks may prompt
officials in the executive and legislative branches as well as others associated
with the selection process, namely the ABA, to organize their efforts in ways
which would expedite appointments, although inherent restraints may limit the
improvement that can be secured.
Informal guidance meant to fucilitate selection, however, will be effective
insofur as those involved honor it, while assigning informal guidelines legal
force, whether by statute, Senate rule, or administrative regulation, may be
fruitless. Deadlines for filling openings could be ignored with impunity, unless
these deadlines trigger alternative appointment powers155 or can be enforced in
court, which seems improbable in light of current justiciability and other constitutional strictures. 156

ii. Redundancies and paperwork
It is also possible to realize economies with respect to the three written
questionnaires which the White House and the Justice Department, the ABA,
and the Senate Judiciary Committee now require nominees to complete. 157 For
instance, nominees should be required to answer only one questionnaire which
furnishes the material that the four entities seek Those participants must seriously evaluate whether some questions might be deleted or changed to make the
inquiry less onerous and intrusive without forfeiting pertinent information.

154

See supro notes 132-Sl and accompanying text
155 For discussion of a recent c:xpcricncc which illustrates the inefficacy of statutoiy time limits, sec Bcrmant ct al., supro note 6, at 337 n.Sl.
156 See id. at 337.
157 See supro note 47 and accompanying text
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e. A Word About Limitations on Measures for Treating Traditional
Judicial Selection
Many of the above measures, which are principally intended to improve the
judicial selection process by increasing efficiency and resources, could facilitate
the :filling of vacancies. However, these mechanisms only partially respond to
certain problems, such as phenomena inherent in selection, that are responsible
for delay. The techniques may merely ameliorate the difficulties attributable to
politics, so vividly illustrated by the 1997 experience with judicial appointments.
Politics pervades selection in ways that improved processes may treat only
minimaJJy.

2. Nontraditional Methods ofAppointment
Alternative, less conventional methods for placing judges on the federal
courts might be applied if prolonged unfilled vacancies can be ascribed to inordinate delays caused by the President or the Senate. Recess appointments constitute the most "traditional" of these options in the sense that the Constitution
expressly authorizes the Chief Executive to invoke recess commissions when
:filling vacancies, while other options may require constitutional amendment or
statutozy authorization.

a. Recess Appointments
The Recess Appointments clause affords the most important mechanism that
the President might employ to treat protracted vacancies in judgeships resulting
from delays in Senate action on nominees. 158 Article II expressly empowers the
Chief Executive, when the Senate is not in session, to name individuals to
offices for which appointment otherwise requires the advice and consent of the
Senate.159
Recipients of recess commissions serve until the Senate confirms them or
another nominee or until the conclusion of the Senate's next session. whichever
happens first 160 Presidents with diverse political viewpoints have relied on the
Recess Appointments clause in naming judges throughout the nation's histozy,
although no Chief Executive has employed this method to fill judicial openings

158 See Bemiant ct al., supra note 6, at 337-40.
159 See U.S. CONST. art. Il, § 2, cl. 3.
160 Seeid.

562

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[VoL47

since 1980.161 Recess appointments are a rather convenient means for attempting to augment the judiciary's working capacity when delays in nominating candidates or in confirming nominees prolong vacancies.
Legal, political, and practical considerations, however, limit the commissions' utility. Legitimate and serious questions might be raised about the
decisional independence of those granted recess commissions before Senate
confirmation and about the Senate's capacity to scrutinize effectively these
persons' nominations for permanent positions. 162 Recess appointments could
also be challenged because individuals who hold them lack life tenure and
protection against salary diminution, although the Second and Ninth Circuits
have sustained the commissions' validity. 163 Nonetheless, valid concerns
remain regarding the effect on recess appointees' decisional independence of
their limited tenure and interest in permanent appointment Substantially
increased reliance on recess commissions today, therefore, may provoke
opposition from the Senate and the legal community.
Additional legal or political restraints might accompany the employment of
recess judicial appointments. For example, questions respecting the meaning of
"recess" could lead Chief Executives to follow the cautious approach of exercising this authority only in the period between the two sessions of each Congress, rather than during intrasessional recesses. 164 The limitations which Congress has imposed on the reimbursement of recess appointees :further constrict
the commissions' appeal. 165
Apart :from legal and political complications, enhanced dependence on recess
appointments would have c~cribed practical worth. The period after the
President nominates candidates typically comprises less than twenty percent of
the time required to fill openings, even though the period needed for Senate
confirmation has substantially increased since 1975.166 Because individuals
granted recess commissions are usually people who were already chosen for
nomination, the use ofrecess appointments will minimally decrease the time that
161
See Bclillllllt ct al., supra note 6, at 337-38; see also United States v. Woodley, 751 F.2d 1008 (9th
Cir. 1985) (en bane); Thomas A. Curtis, Note, Recess Appointments to Article DI Cou11s: The Use ofHistorical Practice in Constitutional Interpretation, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1758 (1984).
162
See CHAsE, supra note 6, at 15-16; Bemumt ct al., supra note 6, at 338.
163
See Woodley, 751 F.2d at 1009-14; United States v. Allocco, 305 F.2d 704, 708-09 (2d Cir. 1962).
164
See Bclillllllt ct al., supra note 6, at 339; Michael A. Carner, Note, When Is the Senate in Recess for
Pu"6oses ofthe Recess Appointments Clause?, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2204, 2218-22 (1994).
65
See 5 U.S.C. § 5503 (1994); see also BclDlllilt ct al., supra note 6, at 339 & n.62
166
See BclIDllllt ct al., supra note 6, at 339.
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vacancies remain open and might only lead the Senate to delay confirming
recess appointees.167
These benefits and disadvantages, particularly legal, policy and practical
restraints, suggest that recess commissions are not a panacea for the impasse
over judicial vacancies but may afford a measure of relief; especially in
carefully calibrated contexts. For example, the Chief Executive might
selectively apply recess appointments in courts that have judicial emergencies
and to nominees with impeccable qualifications or whom home-state senators
strongly support. The President could correspondingly fill openings temporarily
with persons, including bankruptcy and magistrate judges, who would not
receive consideration for permanent appointments, thereby allowing a truncated
review process and provoking less political opposition :from Congress.168 In the
final analysis, dependence on recess commissions today may be as
confrontational and inefficacious as the apparent reluctance of senators to
confirm promptly judges appointed by Presidents of another party. Recess
appointments' greatest value might be in dramatizing the risk that judicial
openings pose to the federal courts and the importance of expeditiously filling
those vacancies. Over the longer term, the practice's awkward position in the
constitutional :framework of life-tenured judges and its pragmatic policy
restraints could well limit the value of recess commissions.

b. Alternative Methods for Filling Vacant Judgeships IfPresidential or
Senatorial Inaction Causes Inordinate Delay
Should presidential or senatorial inaction lead to inordinate delays in filling
open judgeships, several less traditional alternatives could be explored.169 The
options' unconventional nature and the constitutional, political and practical
complications that they raise probably make the measures less feasible. Indeed,
the Judicial Conference, in its Long Range Plan, explored several ideas for
treating the vacancies problem. It did this to emphasize how serious the difficulty is and ''why it requires prompt attention and appropriate action," even
though the plan did ''not endorse such drastic remedies."170

167 See Id. at 339-40.
168 See Id. at 340 n.65.
169 LONG RANGE PUN, supra note 20, at 103, 137-40; BcIID3Il1 ct al., supra note 6, at 340-14; see also
N.Y. City Bar, supra note 7.
170 LONG RANGE PUN, supra note 20, at 103 (citation omitted). "If judicial vacancies cannot be filled
expeditiously, disabling the judicimy and leaving no other viable remedy, the political branches raay have to
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The principal alternative would authorize the President and the Senate to act
alone in filling judgeships which remain open because of inaction by the Chief
Executive or the Senate in nominating candidates or in exercising advice and
consent For instance, the President might be permitted to appoint judges absent
Senate confirmation, or judicial nominations could automatically be deemed
confirmed if the Senate railed to act on nominations within a specified period
after receiving them. 171 The Senate might concomitantly be empowered to name
judges should the Chief Executive neglect to tender nominations or to make recess appointments within a prescribed time after vacancies occur.172
A related approach would be to vest in a judicial branch organ the power to
fill open judgeships with permanent or interim appointments. 173 More specifically, the Chief Justice of the United States, the Judicial Conference or a
specific court could be authorized to name judges when the President mils to
make nominations or recess appointments within a set period after vacancies
happen, when tlte Senate does not act on nominations within a prescribed time of
their receipt, or when courts having open judgeships show that they urgently
need to fill vacancies by, for example, demonstrating ''judicial emergencies."174
The creation of one or nmltiple "backup" appointment procedures would
strengthen temporal restrictions that might be statutorily imposed on presidential
or senatorial participation in judicial selection.175 This alternative could lead to
the implementation of more efficient measures while fostering the resolution of
political disagreements which can delay nomination and confirmation. It seems
improbable that the President or the Congress will cede complete responsibility
for choosing judges to one another. However, the Chief Executive and the
Congress could consider it more palatable to lodge authority for interim
appointments in the less partisanjudiciary,176 particularly if the power is limited
to either protracted openings or similarly exigent situations. 177 The possibility
consider alternative =thods for appointing Article ill judges that othcxwisc would be \lllaCCcptable (even if
constitutional revision is required)." Id. at 137-38.
171
See LONG RANG!! PLAN, supra note 20, at 138; BemiaD! ct al., supra note 6, at 340. Recess appointments could also be continued in effect until vacancies were filled. See LONG RANG!! PLAN, supra, at 138.
172 See LONG RANOl!PLAN, supra note 20, at 138; Bcmum1 ct al, supra note 6, at 340.
173
Bcilllllllt ct al, supra note 6, at340; N.Y. City Bar, supra note 7, at 378-79.
174
See BcmiaD! et al., supra note 6, at 340. A comt might also show that its "annual vacancy rate or average caseload for its active judges exceeds a prescribed lcveL" Id.
175
LONG RANGl!PLAN, supra note 20, at 138; BcmiaD! ct al., supra note 6, at 340-41; see also N.Y. City
Bar, supra note 7, at 378-80.
176
This suggestion finds support in the statutoi:y provision for interim appointments of United States Attorneys. See 28 U.S.C. § 546 (1994).
177 Numerous states so provide. See L\RR.YBl!RKSON ET AL., JUDICIAL Sl!Ll!Cl10N IN nm UNm!D SfATl!S:
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of placing appointment authority in neutral third parties might well encourage
politicians who have primary responsibility for judicial selection to honor
prescribed temporal restrictions.178
Numerous political, practical and constitutional difficulties could affect the
institution of these backup appointment mechanisms. Chief Executives and
members of the Senate have long seen the choice of judges as an important
means of affecting the law's development and of exercising political patronage.179 Therefore, .measures that would erode the benefits that the President and
senators derive from judicial appointments would probably provoke vigorous
opposition. The process may become overpoliticized if participants cast aspersions on whether the President or the Senate caused specific delays or if astute
politicians manipulate the automatic appointment aspects.180
Invocation of these devices would raise several pragmatic concerns,
especially regarding the advantages to be attained. The earlier examination
revealed that the preliminary screening, assessment, and investigation of
candidates and nominees consumes much time. 181 Removing senators from the
selection process would effect minima] temporal savings. Eliminating
presidential involvement would be similarly inefficacious. For instance, were
either the Senate or the judiciary to assume responsibility for designating and
screening potential nominees, those tasks would consume analogous resources.
The time required for complete FBI background investigations could be saved
by assigning bankruptcy or magistrate judges to hear cases temporarily or by
appointing special masters. However, the judicial officers' brief tenure and lack
of protection from salary reduction mean that they would be exercising
considerably less than full Article III jurisdiction.182 In the end, procedures that
exclude the Chief Executive or the Senate from judicial selection when delay
occurs might not necessarily expedite the completion of the necessary
background work and could even prompt hasty, ill-conceived decisionmaking,

A COMPENDIUM OF PROVISIONS (1981); MAR.VIN COMISKY ET AL., THE 1UDICIAR.Y SELECTION, COMPENSATION,
ETHICS, AND DISCIPLINE 6-7 (1987).

178 The District of Columbia uses an lllllllogous provision. See D.C. CODE ANN. tit. 11 app. §§ 433-434

(1981).

179 See CHASE, supra note 6 passim; I.any W. Yackle, Choosing Judges the Democratic Way, 69 B.U. L.
REV. 273, 279-80 (1989).
180 See N.Y. City Bar, supra note 7, at 379.
181 See supra notes 22-37 and accompaeying text.
182 See LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 20, at 139-40; Beonant et al., supra note 6, at 342; see also N.Y.
City Bar, supra note 7, at 379 (suggesting likelihood of lengthy litigation over judges).
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which would be peculiarly inappropriate considering that appointments confer
both the authority ofthe state and life tenure. 183
It may also be inadvisable as a policy matter to designate interim appointees
who have not passed the qualifications inquiry intrinsic to the appointments
process and who lack life tenure's protections. If these appointees were to become nominees for permanent positions, their judicial decisionmaking might appear intended to please the Senate which must ultimately confirm interim.judges.
Perhaps most troubling would be questions regarding the constitutionality of
legislation that reallocates the judicial appointment power. 184 Because judges
are officers of the United States, the Appointments Clause requires the Chief
Executive to "nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate"
appoint them. 185 Even though Congress can vest "in the President alone, in the
Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments" the authority to appoint those
inferior officers whom Congress deems appropriate, this phrasing does not empower Congress to name the officers. 186 A constitutional amendment, therefore,
would be necessary to authorize senatorial appointment ofjudges.
Notwithstanding the apparent breadth of Congress's\authority to authorize
the appointment of inferior officers, this term.may not encompass judges.187 The
constitutional framers apparently intended that judges would be appointed only
in the way prescribed for principal officers, by presidential nomination and
Senate confirmation.188 Moreover, the rank, responsibility and tenure of Article
m judges suggest that they are not inferior officers as envisioned in the
Appointments Clause. 189 If either of these constructions is correct, any approach
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184
185
186
187
188

See BelD1llllt ct al., supra note 6, at 341.
LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note20, at 138; BelD1llllt ct al, supra note 6, at 342.
U.S. CONST. art. Il, § 2, cl. 2
Id.; Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 132-33 (1976).
BclD1llllt ct al., supra note 6, at 342-43.
See nm RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 119-21, 126-28, 224-26, 230-31 (Max
Fammd ed., 3d ed. 1966); id. at 37-39, 41-46, 71-83, 539-40, 599-600; JEFFREY Sf. JOHN, CONS1TnmONAL
JOURNAL: A CORR.ESPONDENI"S REPORT FROM THE CONVENTION OF 1787, at 118, 199 (1987). See generally
JOSEPH P. HARRIS, nm ADVICE AND CONSENT OF THE SENATE: A SfUDY OF THE CONFIRMATION OF AP·
POINTMENTS BY THE UNITED SfATES SENATE 19-24 (1953); Theodore Y. Blmnoft; Separation ofPowers and
the Origins ofthe Appointment Clause, 37 SYRACUSEL. REV. 1037, 1061-70 (1987).
189 "[F]rom the early days of the Republic [t]hc practical construction has unifomily been that [judges of
the inferior courts] arc not ••• inferior officers."' Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 191, n.7 (1994)
(Souter, ]., concurring) (citing 3 JOSEPH SfORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONS1TnmON OF THE UNITED SfATl!S
456 n.1 (1833)).
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which eliminates the Senate's role in the appointments process or transfers
appointing power to the judiciary would require a constitutional amendment190

B. Measures to Treat Increasing Caseloads
All three branches of the federal government could also attempt to treat the
dramatic expansion in the magnitude and complexity of district and appellate
civil and criminal dockets which has required that Congress greatly enlarge the
bench, thus promoting concomitant increases in the number and :frequency ofjudicial openings, since the 1960s. Reductions in the quantity of litigation which
parties pursue in federal court or the more expeditious resolution of those cases
that are pursued would be responsive to the vacancies conundrum; however, the
prospects for decreasing dockets or expediting dispositions are minuscule.
First, there is considerable consensus that the size and complexity of federal
civil and criminal dockets will not shrink any time soon, principally because
Congress is more likely to broaden than constrict federal court jurisdiction in the
future. 191 The federal forum will correspondingly continue to have greater appeal than state court for many individuals and entities that have the option of
litigating in either system192 Second, although courts and judges have devised
and applied numerous measures for :fucilitating the resolution of federal court
disputes, even those mechanisms which do limit delay apparently will not save
enough time to make much difference, primarily because the sheer quantity of
additional filings will oveiwhelm. any savings realized.
The unprecedented nationwide experiment with procedures for decreasing
delay and expense in federal civil litigation under the Civil Justice Reform Act
of 1990 is illustrative.193 The implementation ofa few techniques might somewhat reduce the time to disposition; however, they would only minima])y affect
the present conditions created by growing dockets. 194 The regional circuits have
190 See Bcilll!IIlt ct al., supra note 6, at 345 nn.78-79.
191 See, e.g., Kathleen F. Brickey, Criminal Mischief: 11ze Federalization ofAmerican Criminal Law, 46
IJASTINOS L.J. 1135 (1995). See generally Honorable Stephen Breyer, 11ze Donative Lecture Series:
"Administering Justice in the First Circuit," 24 SUFFOLK U. L. REY. 29, 34-37 (1990); Tobias, New Certiorari, supra note 18, at 1268-69.
192 See. e.g., EIWin Chcmerinsky, Parity Reconsidered: Defining a Role for the Federal Judiciary, 36
UCLAL. REY. 233 (1988); BurtNeubome, The Myth ofParity, 90 HARV. L. REY. 1105 (1977).
193 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-82 (1994). See generally Carl Tobias, Improving the 1988 and 1990 Judicial
Improvements Acts, 46 5rAN. L. REY. 1589 (1994).
194 See ]AMES

s. KAKALIK ET AL, ]UST, SPEEDY AND INEXPENSIVE?

AN EVALUATION OF 1UDICIAL CASE

MANAGEMENT UNDER TIIE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT (1996). See generally Carl Tobias, Civil Justice Refo1111 Sunset, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. No. 3 (July).
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similarly attempted to address the quarter-century crisis of volume by employing
measures that will expedite appeals. 195 Some mechanisms have fucilitated
resolution, but burgeoning appellate caseloads have outstripped the temporal
gains. Several widely-used procedures, namely restrictions on oral arguments
and written opinions, have seemingly imposed disadvantages, such as eroding
appellate justice or its appearance. 196
C. Measures to Treat the Effects ofJudicial Vacancies
Several difficulties examined above have led to rather widespread consensus
that it is at least as profitable to treat the impacts of unfilled judicial openings as
it is to treat their sources.197 Delays in filling many vacancies can be attributed
substantially to unavoidable, and often intractable, political considerations or to
unpredictable ci.rcwmtances which are specific to individual nominees and
which are manifested for different persons at different points in the process.
Indeed, the City Bar of New York found that there was "no practical way in
which the average time lag of ten months or more between vacancy and
candidate clearance is likely to be improved appreciably in the foreseeable
future." 198 Regardless of the reasons for protracted openings, their effect is
identical: courts n:mst resolve mounting caseloads with insufficient judicial
resources. Some of the remedial mechanisms previously surveyed could
expedite judicial appointments; however, vacancies will certainly continue to
arise more quickly than they can be filled. 199 Although judges have responded
effectively to the difficulties which openings impose by sharing resources,
employing innovative measures and working harder, the upward trend in the
number and duration of vacancies might overwhelm the system unless the
complications and their impacts are treated. Courts, therefore, n:mst develop and
maintain the ability to operate efficaciously at less than full capacity. The above
propositions prompted the Judicial Conference to conclude that "ultimately it
195

See, e.g., !ST CIR. R. 36.1, 36.2; 4TH CIR. R. 34(a), 36; 7TH CIR. R. 34{f), 53; Arthur D. Hellman,
Central Staffin Appellate Courts: The Experience ofthe Ninth Circuit, 68 CAL. L. REV. 937 (1980); Patricia
M. Wald, The Problem with the Courts: Black-Robed Bureaucracy, or Collegiality Under Challenge?, 42
MD. L. REV. 766, 776-79 (1983).
196
See, e.g., !ST CIR. R. 36.1, 36.2; 4TH CIR. R. 34(a), 36; 7TH CIR. R. 34{f), 53. See generally THOMAS
E. BAKER, RATIONINOJUSTJCl!ON APPEAL: THl!PROBLl!MS OF'IHI! U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS 108-17, 119-35,
139-47 (1994); Richman & Reynolds, supra note 21.
197
Bemiant ct al., supra notc6, at 344-45; see also LONORANGl!PLAN, supra note 20, at 103; N.Y. City
Bar, supra note 7, at 381-82.
198
N.Y. City Bar, supra note 7, at 382; see also Bcimant ct al., supra note 6, at 344; supra notes 59-64
and accompanying text
199

See Bcmumt ct al., supra note 6, at 344-45.
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may be more worthwhile to address the effect of the vacancy problem rather
than its causes."200

1. Adjusting Workload Formulas So that New Judgeships Take Account of
Prolonged Vacancies
Congress could allocate judgeships in sufficient numbers to offset predicted
vacancy rates. 201 It might ascertain needs for judgeships through a workload
formula which considers the average number and length of openings nationwide,
while specific courts could factor into new judgeship requests their vacancy
rates, for instance, through increasing the positions requested by the same percentage.202 Building in a cushion premised on national statistics may create discrepancies in the judicial resources available to courts. However, Congress and
the judiciary can monitor the policy's impacts and eliminate unneeded positions
by attrition when new openings arise. 203 If resources were underutilized, they
could be temporarily assigned to courts which are experiencing workload burdens that exceed the capacity ofjudges who are available locally.204
It is unclear that the advantages afforded by this approach would outweigh
its detriments. Given the substantial number of existing vacancies and the
apparently intractable nature of openings, authorizing additional judgeships
could simply compound the difficulty by increasing the seats to be filled. The
perceived expense of creating new judgeships might dampen congressional
enthusiasm for this approach.
Premising requests for judgeships on such a variable consideration may also
erode the credibility of the judiciary's current methodology for ascertaining
needed judicial resources. Even if there were consensus in theory about the propriety of considering foreseeable openings in authorizing judgeships, reaching
practical agreement on how to evaluate them.may be problematic. Regardless of
these difficulties, this option could :further postpone the filling of vacancies, if
the Administration and Congress believed that the courts' workload demands no
longer required expeditious action on judicial selection.205

2oo LoNG RANGE PLAN, supra note 20, at 103 {emphasis supplied).

201 Bconant ct al., supra note 6, at 345-46; N.Y. City Bar, supra note 7, at 381-82.
See Bconant ct al., supra note 6, at 345.
203 Id.; see also N.Y. City Bar, supra note 7, at 381-82.
204 Bconant ct al., supra note 6, at 345.
205 See Bconant ct al., supra note 6, at 346.
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It is important to remember that requests by the Third Branch for more
judges are principally based on ratios of judicial workload to numbers of
authorized positions.206 Because this calculation can overestimate the input of
senior, visiting and adjunct judges, it could force the courts to forgo additional
active judges for other potentially less certain resources in times of expanding
caseloads and budgetary restraints. Several of the above fuctors may have
caused the Judicial Conference to not recommend this approach in its Long
Range Plan.
2. Floater Judgeships

Because openings pose system-wide difficulties, Congress could mitigate
their impacts on the entire judiciazy by creating a fixed number of judgeships
that are not tied to specific courts.207 This approach would enable the judiciazy
to assign courts with protracted vacancies additional resources while avoiding
the risks of modifying the judgeship formulae and of overstaffing particular
courts in which openings have been filled.
This measure, however, raises several theoretical and practical concerns.
Virb.Jally all federal judges have come from and been identified with the geographic locales that they serve.208 Floater judgeships, therefore, may be a philosophically or politically unpalatable divergence from this tradition. 209 AB a
practical matter, finding highly competent people to accept these types of inconvenient assignments might be problematic. Certain administrative difficulties
involving support personnel and chambers as well as compensation for travel
and living expenses may also arise.210 Notwithstanding these practical complications which may fuirly be characterized as significant, floater judgeships
might be effective in certain unusual situations.211 For instance, when there is
an acute need for additional judicial resources in a particular court and a political impasse or controversy involving a specific candidate sty.mies prompt appointment, floater judgeships could prove useful.

206
207

Id.

The judges could "ordinarily sit in districts close to their residences but ••• also ••• sit for specific periods in any district where vacancies have created a judicial manpower shortage." N.Y. City Bar, supra note 7, at
380; see also Ben:nant ct al., supra note 6, at 346.
20& See Bcn:nant ct al., supra note 6, at 346.
209 See id. But sec Williams, supra note 7, at 193.
210
See Bcn:nant ct al., supra note 6, at347; N.Y. City Bar, supra note 7, at 380-81.
211 See N.Y. City Bar, supra note 7, at 381.

1998]

FEDERAL JUDICIAL SELECTION

571

3. Temporary Judicial Assignments
The temporary assignment of judicial officers to circuits or districts that are
attempting to resolve burgeoning caseloads with less than their :full complements
ofjudges would afford another means of assisting these courts.212 For example,
those appeals courts and districts might recruit senior judges and accept
volunteers from courts experiencing less onerous dockets. Furthermore, the
judiciary could dispatch "judicial emergency teanls" comprised of available
circuit, district and magistrate judges and support personnel to aid understaffed
courts with burdensome caseloads.213
The Third Branch has long employed inter- and intra-circuit assignments to
move judicial resources from courts encountering lighter dockets to those needing help, and there will be a growing need for the type of temporary assistance
which visiting judges can afford. The Judicial Conference recently recognized
the value of these assignments but admonished that existing proc~es for
making them are "often cumbersome, potentially frustrating prompt relief of
overburdened courts even where sufficient [systemic] judicial resources exist"
and that the districts' present alignment requires "rethinking the rigid allocation
ofjudges to individual courts."214
The Conference, therefore, called for a simpler, more :flexible system of temporary assignments.215 Should the judiciary be unable to address future needs
for judicial resources promptly and efficiently, the Conference recommended
consideration of structural modifications which would streamline temporary assignment authority.216 For instance, district judges might be empowered to hold
court in districts located within specific distances or travel times of their permanent duty stations when so designated by chief judges.217 Circuits and districts
could also enter standing agreements for particular periods that would permit
immediate cross-assignment of judicial officers upon the courts' request and
concurrence.218
2l2 LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 20, at 98-100, 104-05.
213
214

See id. at 100, 104.
Id. at 98-99.
215 Seeid.
216 See id. at 99.
217 See id.
218 See id. "Although 50lllld reasons may exist to retain oversight and control of judicial movements in
geDCral, there is little to recommend in a process that fiustmtes access by ovciburdcncd courts to DC81by,
undcnttiliz.cd judicial resources." Id. The Conference also analyzed :measures to address disparate worldoads,
such as removing hurdles to intcrdistrlct tnmsfi:rs of cases for reasons of judicial economy and to intcrdistrlct
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4. Individual Court Actions
The Judicial Conference recommended that each court actively devise measures for expediting judicial business when it nrust function at less than :full
strength.219 Illustrative is the United States Code provision which empowers the
chief judges of appeals courts to suspend the requirement that a majority of
judges who serve on appellate panels be active members of their courts when
emergencies exist220 Indeed, the enormous caseload and the number and length
of vacancies in the Ninth Circuit has led the court to exercise this authority and
even required that it recently postpone 600 scheduled oral arguments.221

D. Summary by Way ofTransition
The above analyses of the persistent judgeships conundrum, of the present
impasse and of potential remedies yield several insights. Certain of judicial selection' s intrinsic necessities, including its political nature, and competing priorities, such as the need for efficient but careful investigation and evaluation of
nominees' qualifications and character, lead to essentially irreducible delay and
:frustrate resolution of the permanent vacancies problem. Political phenomena
inherent in the traditional appointments process concomitantly contribute to this
longstanding dilemma and best explain the current impasse, although executive
and legislative branch officials could invoke numerous mechanisms which
would apparently respond to the political fuctors and, thus, improve the existing
circumstances if they had the requisite political will. Most of the possible solutions would correspondingly have limited utility for treating much intrinsic delay, and their implementation would impose practical, political or legal disadvantages.
In short, the application of various measures could effect a modicum of
temporal savings, particularly in that delay which is unnecessary. However,
these techniques will not :fully redress the generic vacancies difficulty or
appreciably accelerate selection. Rather, they may only partially resolve those
complications that result from the process's growing politicization. Therefore,
attempts to attack directly and cooperatively the present problem's political

and illtercircuit judicial assigmncnts and adopting procedures for clarifying judicial authority to conduct
proceedings in districts otherthanjudgcs' permanent duty stations. See id. at 99-100.
219
See id. at 104-05.
220
See 28 U.S.C. § 46{b) (1994); see also LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 20, at 104-05.
221 See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
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dimensions and to address the effects of those features and of the long-term
openings conundrum should prove more productive.
I am not advocating retention of the status quo, nmch less abandonment of
any efforts to solve the persistent vacancies dilemma or the existing impasse.
However, entities and individuals responsible for judicial selection nmst strike
and maintain an appropriate balance between the need for expedition and care in
judicial selection and nmst obviously attempt to eliminate unnecessary delay. I
principally mean to emphasize that considerable delay is inherent and impervious to remediation or is attributable to the inexorable pressures of politics and
resists felicitous treatment as well as the importance of being realistic about the
prospects for success. Despite the elusive character of numerous difficulties and
the illusory nature of some potential remedies, officials in the executive, legislative and judicial branches nmst become more sensitive to the harm engendered
by unfilled openings and nmst rededicate themselves to improving the current
situation.
III. PREFERABLE SOLUTIONS

A. The Persistent Vacancies Problem
The most effective solution for perennial judicial vacancies would apparently
be the creation of enough additional judgeships, especially by approving more
judges for those courts which have chronic openings, to accord the existing
judiciary the full complement of judicial officers now authorized. 222 This option
would avoid certain theoretical, legal and pragmatic complications presented by
the alternatives that I have surveyed. Although officials in the Administration,
Congress, and the courts might attempt to solve the pennanent vacancies
problem with measures other than new judgeships, particularly techniques which
cure unnecessary delay, they should appreciate that the mechanisms may only
minimaUy decrease those temporal restraints which are essentially irreducible.

B. The Persistent Problem and the Current Impasse
1. The Executive Branch and the Senate
When confronting the generic difficulty, but primarily present conditions, the
President and senators nmst do everything possible to improve the discharge of
222

See supra notes 201-04 and accompanying text
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their judicial selection duties. For instance, the Chief Executive and the Senate
might undertake efforts to streamline those meets of the process for which each
has responsibility as well as to calibrate meticulously the importance of
searching investigation and review of candidates' character and competence
with the need to expedite appointments. Officials in the executive and
legislative branches should address increasing politicization's contributions to
the persistent complication and the existing impasse, even as they recognize that
attempts to treat this phenomenon will probably prove controversial and perhaps
be unsuccessful. The officers n:mst also exert the political will to work
cooperatively, to reach reasonable accommodations, and to resolve efficaciously
for the good of the courts and the country those disputes that arise. The officials
as well should cease participating in activities, such as recriminations over who
is most responsible for delay in selection, which appear to be motivated
principally by efforts to secure momentary political victories and by
gamesmanship. Insofur as ~ting politicization slows judicial appointments
and caseload resolution, thus eroding civil and criminal justice, and fosters the
perception that public officials are sacrificing the best interests of the courts and
the nation for short-term partisan advantage, this phenomenon could undermine
the American people's respect for Congress, both political parties, and perhaps
the judiciazy.

2. The Executive Branch
The above examination showed that President Clinton has some
responsibility for the large number of judgeships which are currently open. For
example, at the commencement of the 105th Congress, he submitted twenty-two
nominees, few of them new. During 1997 he steadily, albeit irregularly,
tendered additional names. Although many of these people had excellent
qualifications and comparatively moderate political views, Senator Hatch
claimed that some did not223 The Chief Executive has now apparently supplied
the Judiciaty Committee with sufficient numbers of very capable nominees who
hold political perspectives which should be palatable to Republicans for it to
process, and he n:mst continue forwarding the names of additional individuals at
a pace that will fucilitate the Committee's work In fuirness, President Clinton
and his aides have probably proceeded cautiously in scrutinizing candidates'
capabilities, character, and political acceptability because errors in judgment at

223 See supra notes 74-76, 78-79 and accompanying text.
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this stage can undermine Administration credibility, delay appointments and
even jeopardize the selection process.

The President may want to supplement these efforts by setting certain priorities with a :finely-calibrated analysis which includes: all of the judicial vacancies
and their locations; how long the seats have remained open; present and projected caseload responsibilities and backlogs of the judgeships and the courts;
and the relative difficulty of filling the vacancies. For instance, fears about
overwhelming dockets or backlogs and considerations of efficiency might suggest that the Chief Executive immediately attempt to appoint persons who consultation reveals are acceptable to Republican senators in courts having multiple
openings which constimte judicial emergencies.224 By comparison, concerns regarding the bench's quality could lead the President to reject compromise and
publicly insist on Senate confirmation of nominees with superior qualifications
whom he strongly favors for courts that have less exigent circumstances.
At the outset, the Chief Executive should also explore and implement numerous rather conciliatory measures which are available. These techniques will
probably be more effective and he can rely on their prior invocation when resorting to less cooperative mechanisms, if that becomes necessary. The President might consider and apply means which would enhance the discharge of
Administration responsibilities for judicial appointments. For example, President Clinton and his assistants could expedite the submission of nominations by
compiling their own lists of possible nominees for appellate court openings and
by encouraging senators to forward district court recommendations more
promptly, perhaps through greater reliance on staff or selection commissions.
Moreover, the Chief Executive might streamline Administration investigation
and analysis of candidates by limiting the number of interviews, questionnaires
and participants employed.
To improve the confirmation process, the President and his aides could work
with entities, namely the Senate Judiciary Committee and the ABA, which
investigate and evaluate nominees, and propose that they undertake efforts
similar to those above and even consolidate or eliminate redundant activities.
The Administration might enhance nomination and confirmation through
consultation with individual senators and the Judiciary Committee, soliciting
their advice and help as to candidates before formally tendering names.

224

See Infra notes 226-28 and accompanying tctt.
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Additional conciliatozy approaches could more specifically treat the present
impasse. For instance, the Chief Executive may want to consider submitting
fewer nominees who will prompt Republican Party opposition. Illustrative was
the June nomination for a Second Circuit vacancy of Judge Sonia Sotomayor, a
district judge whom President Bush had appointed.225 She should rather easily
secure confirmation because she was already approved once, will probably have
Republican senators' support, and will bring valuable experience derived from
federal district court service, which can correspondingly inform assessment of
the her qualifications and character. These types of benefits have generally
made the elevation of current federal district judges to the appellate bench a
time-honored technique for fucilitating selection that many Chief Executives,
including Presidents Reagan and Bush, successfully used226 and that the Clinton
Administration occasionally employed during its first term.227
The Chief Executive should at least think about nominating additional,
highly-qualified individuals who have affiliations with the opposing party.228
This approach could be particularly effective in certain contexts. Illustrative are
courts which have protracted vacancies and substantial caseloads or backlogs
while being situated in. or encompassing, states that have two Republican senators or that traditionally vote Republican. The Ninth Circuit, which has nine
openings among its twenty-eight active judgeships and the nation's largest appellate docket, affords a general example.229 One of the court's "Arizona seats"
remained unfilled for nearly two years, principally because the state's Republican senators and its Democratic officials were deadlocked.230
For courts with numerous longterm vacancies and enormous caseloads or
backlogs which are located in states where the politicians who propose or might
block candidates simply cannot agree, the Administration could even consider
trade-offs, such as allowing Republicans to recommend half the nominees whom
Democrats · suggest231 President Clinton might concomitantly offer the
225 See The White House, Office of the Press Sec'y, President Clinton Nominates Sotomayor to the Appellate Bench (June 25, 1997); see also supra note 77 and accompanying tc:xt.
226 See, e.g., Neil A. Lewis, Bush Picking the Kind of Judges Reagan Favored, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10,
1990, at Al; Ruth Marcus, Bush Quietly Fosters Conservative Trend In Courts, WASH. POST, Feb. 18, 1991,
at Al; see also Tobias, Filling the Federal Courts In an Election Year, supra note 76, at 752.
227 Examples are Second Circuit Judges Jose Cabrancs and Pierre Leval
228
See supra note 77 and accompanying tc:xt.
229 See also supra note 153 and accompanying tc:xt.
230 Telephone conversation with Nan Aron, Alliance for Justice, Washington, D.C. (Aug. 19, 1997); see
also Lewis, supra note 80; supra note 153.
231
Senator Bidcn suggested that Republican senators were contcmplatiDg a similar "infoonal agreement,"

1998]

FEDERAL JUDICIAL SELECTION

577

Republicans the opportunity to propose some percentage of candidates in
exchange for legislation that would authorize new judgeships,232 thereby
effectively inaugurating a bipartisan judiciary, an idea which may find
substantial support in the current political climate.233 The Chief Executive could
also strike a separate compromise with Senator Hatch on a prearranged number
of nominees whom the Senate would confirm annually.
If efforts to improve judicial selection and treat the current conundrum by
invoking cooperative measures full, the President may want to entertain and apply less conciliatory approaches. For example, the Chief Executive could use
the presidency as a bully pulpit to blame delay on Republican senators or to cajole or shame them into expediting appointments or even for forcing the issue of
tardy selection by taking it to the American people. Related means for breaking
the impasse might be the submission of nominees for every existing vacancy or
selective reliance on recess appointments, each of which could pressure the Senate to process nominees by publicizing or dramatizing how protracted openings
threaten justice and the importance ofpromptly naming more judges.

3. The Senate
Republican members of the Senate may want and need to evaluate and institute numerous cooperative actions because the above examination shows that
they apparently had at least as nruch responsibility as the Chief Executive for
the present dilemma. These senators might remember that the upper chamber
did confirm a greater number of judges, regardless of how politicized the process actually was, when Republicans were presidents and Democrats had a Senate majority.234 Republican senators should correspondingly keep in mind that
the Grand Old Party may not control the Senate forever and that the roles could
again be reversed. Moreover, the American public might blame Republicans for
the delays in the federal criminal and civil justice systems which unfilled openbut he characteriz.ed this as "not in line with the last 200 ycaIS of tradition." 143 CONG. REC. 82538, 82541
(~ed. Mar. 19, 1997); see also Lewis, supra note 80.
See Goldman & Slotnick, supra note 76, at 271. President Eisenhower made a similar offer in 1960.
See id.; see also Tobias, Filling the Federal Cou11s in an Election Year, supra note 76, at 753.
233
I am not suggesting that the President implement the ideas in the last two sentences; but he should be
realistic and pragmatic, if not mercenaxy, about filling judicial vacancies. The President might want to calculate how critical the openings arc generally and in specific courts. The Administration may reach a point at
which it concludes that filling the bench is less important than certain principles, such as appointing the type of
ju;: whom the President prefi:rs.
See supra note 85 and accompanying text; see also supra note 80 and accompanying text; Hartley &
Holmes, supra note 27.
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ings can foster. The people may also find inappropriate and unfair any unjustifiable delay in naming judges that is attributable to the GOP because it undermines the preference for divided government and checks and balances which
voters expressed by electing a Democratic President who has appointment
power and a Republican Senate with the power of advice and consent

Republican senators, therefore, should seriously analyze and implement conciliatozy approaches. Some measures are comparatively general. Illustrative is
the need for the GOP leadership and specific Republican members of the Senate
to work with the Administration in several areas involving selection. For instance, they could search for and effectuate ways to reduce unnecessary delay
through streamlining various procedures and eliminating unjustifiable redundancies. Senator Hatch might help the President establish priorities by identifying
courts with particularly pressing circumstances and vacancies that may be filled
most easily and by developing additional options and seeking reasonable compromises when agreement cannot be forged. The GOP leaders and individual
senators should also be responsive to Executive Branch requests for advice
through consultation. They could afford frank assessments of candidates under
consideration, furnish justifications for considering unpalatable those so found
and perhaps recommend feasible alternatives. The Republican leadership and
other GOP senators should be receptive to Administration overtures. For example, Republicans must promptly confirm the Bush district court appointee whom
President Clinton nominated for an appeals court opening.
There are numerous, more specific possibilities for cooperation. Insofar as
the delayed submission of nominees has resulted from particular GOP senators'
dissatisfuction with individuals whom Democrats have suggested to the Chief
Executive, Republicans should :facilitate nomination by clearly articulating reasons for their opposition or by proposing compromise candidates who are more
acceptable. Illustrative are efforts to reach consensus that Senator Slade Gorton
(R-Wash.) and Senator Patty Murray (D-Wash.) have recently consummated.235
GOP senators who represent states in which senior politicians of the President's
party have traditionally recommended persons for nomination should correspondingly honor this understanding or at least seek accord by closely conferring with, or suggesting other approaches to, the Democratic officials.
Senator Hatch might also encourage all senators, but especially his Republican colleagues, to expedite nominations by, for instance, attempting to reconcile
235 See supra note 153 and accompanying text.

1998]

FEDERAL JUDICIAL SELECTION

579

disagreements over the processes employed or candidates' suitability. The
Chair could even assume the unenviable, onerous task of attempting to mediate
disputes which seem intractable and perhaps solicit the assistance of Senator
Leahy or the Senate Majority Leader.
lnsofur as the growing number of unfilled vacancies during 1997 can be ascribed to delay in the confirmation process, the GOP leaders and specific Republican senators should examine and implement measures which will expedite
the approval of more judges. Senator Hatch and the Senate Judiciary Committee
must hold hearings and permit votes on additional nominees with truncated review procedures and enhanced resources for investigation and evaluation, perhaps borrowing Justice Department personnel, if necessary. The Judiciary
Committee might also consider eliminating the essentially ceremonial hearings
for non-controversial candidates. To the extent that Senator Hatch has delayed
the processing of specific nominees in his capacity as Chair because he or other
senators have found the individual unacceptable, particularly for his or her perceived political views, longstanding tradition and recent practice suggest that
Senator Hatch should afford the judicial candidates opportunities for hearings
and Committee votes.236 Now that President Clinton has tendered sufficient, acceptable names to :fucilitate smooth Committee processing, even if the number of
individuals he provided and the pace of their nominations in early 1997 arguably
postponed appointments somewhat, the chair should limit his criticism of the
Chief Executive.
The Senate Majority Leader, for his part, must instimte actions which will
improve the confirmation process by expediting :full Senate consideration of
nominees. For example, Senator Lott ought to permit votes on more nominees
by promptly scheduling floor votes after receiving notification of Judiciary
Committee approval. lnsofur as delay has resulted from controversy over particular candidates, especially dissatis:fuction on the part of the Majority Leader
or specific senators, Senator Lott could provide for increased floor debate and
final votes on these individuals. For example, the discussion that preceded Merrick Garland's confirmation apparently engendered lively, candid, and healthy
exchange regarding selection on the Senate floor. 237 To the extent that the Majority Leader has premised floor votes for judicial nominees on other contingencies, such as President Clinton's submission of names for the Federal Election
236 See supra notes 78, 90-95 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 73-76, 224 and accompanying

text.

237 See supra note 108 and accompanying text
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Commission openings, the importance of filling cowt vacancies requires that
Senator Lott cease this practice.
All senators should precisely balance the need for careful evaluation of
nominees with that for expeditious appointment and nmst approve those individuals who possess the abilities and character to be fine judges, while the solons should abandon the elusive, and even quixotic, ~est to predict whether and
which nominees will be so-called "activist judges." 8 Article ID's provisions
for advice and consent probably contemplate that Senate members will scrutinize nominees' professional attributes and character in attempting to ascertain
whether they would be skillful and honest judges as well as arguably envision
some inquiry into judicial candidates' appreciation and respect for separation of
powers in the tripartite system of American government However, senators
should not delay the nominees' consideration in an effort to discern how they
might decide specific cases once confirmed, as this could threaten judicial independence.
Republican Senate members also should vote for nominees who exhibit the
capabilities and character to render excellent judicial service because
Democratic Party senators generally followed that practice when they comprised
a Senate majority and Republicans controlled the presidency.239 In fairness,
some GOP senators apparently resent the Senate's decade-old rejection of Judge
Robert Bork for the Supreme Cowt and the acrimonious battle involving Justice
Clarence Thomas, which the Republicans ascribe primarily to Democratic
senators' concerns about the nominees' future substantive decisionmaking.240
Finally, senators should not consider Repub-lican control of the Senate or their
disagreement with the perceived political perspectives of judicial candidates
sufficient reasons to reject or delay nominees.

238 See, e.g., Hearings on Judicial Activism: Assessing the Impact Before the Senate Judicimy Constitution
Subcomm., July lS, 1997; 143 CONG. REC. S251S (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1997) (statement Sen. Hatch).
239 See supra notes 77, 89-94 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 73-76, 224 and accompanying
text.
240 See, e.g., Gest & Lord, supra note 90; Goldman & Slotnick, supra note 76, at 2S6; Melone, supra note
SS, at 68. See generally GITENSTEIN, supra note 41 (Boric); PAUL SIMON, ADVICE AND CONSl!NI' (1992)
(Thomas). The Democrats' behavior perhaps can be distinguished because of the Supreme Court's enollllOus
significance and becausc Democrats rarely so scIUtinizcd lower court nominees. See 143 CONO. REC. S2S38S2541 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1997) (statements of Sen. Bidcn& Sen. Sarllanes).
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4. The Judicial Branch
Federal judges are considerably less able than the President and the Senate
to effect constructive change in judicial selection because the Constitution assigns principal responsibility to the political branches. Nonetheless, the courts
can undertake certain actions. The federal judiciary nmst implement mechanistm that will encourage more judges to provide advance notice of intent to
change their active status because notification would afford substantial temporal
savings in the nomination process. The courts should also redouble ongoing,
concerted efforts to publicize the existence of unfilled seats and the serious
complications which those openings impose. This could increase public awareness ot: and might galvanize support for ameliorating, the vacancies problem
and perhaps heighten executive and legislative branch officials' sensitivity to the
urgent need for expediting appointments. The Third Branch should also recommend promising methods to :facilitate judicial selection that the Chief Executive
and the Senate could effectuate, while courts and judges nmst institute measures,
such as enhanced reliance on visiting judges, which will efficaciously address
openings' impacts.
CONCLUSION

Empty judgeships significantly threaten the federal civil and criminal justice
process. These are two parts to the dilemma. One is a persistent vacancies
problem. Much delay that attends this complication is intrinsic and resistant to
treatment, although unnecessazy delay can be rectified. The other is a current
dilemma which is primarily political and which public officials could remedy if
they had the requisite political will to do so. President Clinton and the Senate
alone and together nmst eliminate the maxinmm unwarranted delay. They
should also attempt to depoliticize judicial selection, cease criticizing one
another, reconcile their partisan differences and break the present impasse for
the good of the courts and the country. All who participate in the appointments
process should heed President Reagan's conciliatory, telling observation after
the failed Supreme court nominations of Judge Bork and Judge Douglas
Ginsburg:
The experience of the last several months has made all of us a bit
wiser. I believe the mood and the time is now right for all
Americans in this bicentennial year of the Constitution to join
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together in a bipartisan effort to fulfill our constitutional obligation
of restoring the Supreme Court to full strength.241

241

See GITENSTIEN, supra note 41, at 316.
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